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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a systematic study on learning in the repeated game from the 
neuroeconomics perspective. Theoretically, learning theory has been developed to 
complement the traditional game theory in seeking to explain how and which equilibria 
might arise as a consequence of nonequilibrium dynamics among agents with bounded 
rationality. Empirically, learning models have been widely used to describe the 
evolvement of observed behavior over the course of field and laboratory experiments. 
While game theorists are trying to make learning theory more empirically relevant 
(Fudenberg and K. Levine 2009), experimentalists often found it difficult to distinguish 
different learning models based on behavioral choice data alone (Salmon 2001; Wilcox 
2006). Here I sought to investigate learning mechanism from an alternative perspective: 
the neuroeconomics perspective, by combining the game theory experimental paradigm, 
parametric learning models, and neuroscience methods.   
In the first part of the thesis, I sought to identify the underlying learning rule by 
investigating how the brain encodes and computes learning signals used to guide 
behavior in a repeated normal-form game. Specifically, I combined functional 
neuroimaging of a multi-strategy competitive game with computational modeling of three 
widely used classes of learning models—reinforcement, belief-based learning, and their 
hybrid, experience-weighted attraction (EWA). I found evidence for distinct signals for 
reinforcement and belief-based learning in the brain.  More importantly, I rejected the 
hypothesis of a hybrid EWA process at the neural level, even though it outperforms 
reinforcement and belief-based learning models behaviorally. Based on these findings, I 
hypothesized that behavioral choices are a product of a dual-system process at the brain 
level involving reinforcement and belief-based learning signals.   
Although the neural imaging method provides a new dimension of data and 
biologically plausible criterion for model testing, it is silent about the causal relation 
between brain regions and learning signals. In order to validate the neuroimaging results 
and establish the necessary roles of brain regions for strategic learning, I then compared 
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the behavior of focal brain lesion patients to normal volunteers that are matched in terms 
of demographics and cognitive measures. In particular, I studied three different types of 
lesion patients: orbital frontal, dorsal lateral prefrontal and basal ganglia patients, which 
allowed me to dissociate the different roles necessarily to strategic learning.  
In the third part of the thesis, I applied the above findings on the neural circuitry 
underlying strategic learning to explore the behavioral signature of a special yet 
important population, the elderly individuals.  In particular, I compared the behavioral 
results from the strategic learning under two experimental settings: playing against other 
intelligent players and against a computer agent; and between two populations: the 
healthy elderly individuals and young individuals. Our behavioral results suggest that 
elderly individuals adjust more slowly. Interestingly, this is not because elderly 
individuals are insensitive to the new experience but because their prior belief decays 
more slowly than young individuals.  I further posited that within elderly population, 
their prior decays more slowly when they are playing against intelligent people than 
against a computer agent. This comparative study serves as a first step for developing 
biomarkers to quantify decision-making deficits and will shed light on the individual 
differences in productivity and intellectual viability often found within the elderly 
population. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Learning 
Learning in Economics 
Notions of equilibrium are central to theories of strategic behavior in the 
biological and social sciences where individuals must take into account not only available 
rewards and punishments but also behavior of other intelligent agents. It has long been 
recognized, however, that equilibria do not emerge spontaneously, but rather through 
some adaptive process whereby organisms evolve or learn over time.  
In the field of economics, learning theory has been developed theoretically in 
complement to the traditional game theory seeking to explain how and which equilibria 
might arise as a consequence of nonequilibrium dynamics among players with bounded 
rationality. In particular, it develops adaptive models that are simple in implementation 
with some behavioral foundations, and investigates whether such unsophisticated, 
bounded rational learning rules can converge to behavior that is highly sophisticated and 
rational asymptotically. Furthermore, it also seeks to solve some of the long-standing 
conceptual problems in equilibrium theory, such as the absence of explanation for how a 
particular equilibrium is reached in the presence of multiple equilibria, and serves as an 
important way of evaluation the traditional equilibrium concepts (Fudenberg and K. 
Levine 1998; Fudenberg and K. Levine 2009; Foster and Vohra 1998; Hart and Mas-
Colell 2003; Foster and Young 2006). 
Empirically, learning models have been widely used to describe the evolvement 
of observed behavior in real economic lives as well as in field and lab experiments. For 
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example, macroeconomists explained the raise and fall of US inflation rates over the past 
50 years by incorporating the adaptive learning process about the true Phillips curve into 
traditional econometric method of policy evaluations to explain Fed’s dynamic choices 
over target inflation rates (Sargent 2006).  In the field of microeconomics and industrial 
organization, it has also been shown that many types of consumer purchasing behavior 
can be better explained by taking into account the dynamic learning processes itself 
(Crawford and Shum 2005; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009).  
 
Empirical Difficulty 
A large number of theoretical models of learning have therefore been proposed. 
Consequently, an empirical question has come to the fore: which learning models 
describe human behavior best? Over the past decade, there has been a growing literature 
focusing on running statistical horse races among different learning models using 
observed choice data in order to identify which among these learning rules appear to be 
used (Roth and Erev 1995; Mookherjee and Sopher 1997; Cheung and Friedman 1998; 
Erev and Roth 1998; Erev, Roth et al. 2007). Laboratory studies, by employing tight 
control over the decision environment of subjects, provide perhaps the best-case scenario 
for identifying learning processes underlying choice behavior.  Even in these ideal 
circumstances, however, researchers have had great difficulty to accurately distinguish 
between the actual underlying learning rules based on stimulated or observed choice data. 
Experimental economists showed that individual heterogeneity in learning would lead to 
severely biased estimations (Wilcox 2006), as illustrated in Figure 2. Moreover, Salmon 
fitted various learning models with the stimulated choice data and found that a number of 
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learning rules besides the true data generating process can provide statistically 
satisfactory fit, resulting in large Type I or Type II error when testing for the true model. 
 
Figure 1: Histograms showing the frequency distribution of the estimated 
value for a key parameter for belief-based learning model in (Cheung and 
Friedman 1997), based on simulated reinforcement learning and mixed 
population players as well as a sample from Cheung and Friedman’s 
original paper. In reinforcement learning the value should take value 0 
whereas in belief based learning it should be 1. Hence ideally we will 
expect the estimated value for this parameter is near 0 for simulated 
reinforcement players and 1 for belief-based learners. But as shown in 
this figure, the chance for misclassifying the reinforcement learner as 
belief-based learner is very high. Adapted from Salmon (2001). 
 4 
 
Figure 2: Individual heterogeneity in learning would lead to severely 
biased estimations of delta in pooled estimation. The graph shows the 
estimated value of delta with a number of different estimation schemes 
based on simulated learning behavior with high individual heterogeneity. 
As shown in the graph, when true delta is 0.5, the mean of estimated 
delta based on pooled estimation is around 0 indicating the pool of the 
subjects are reinforcement learners whereas in fact they are made of 
equal share of reinforcement and belief based learners. Adapted from 
Wilcox (2006). 
 
Some economists (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; Gul and Pesendorfer 2009) may 
argue that if two economic models both fit behavioral data well enough, there is no need 
to distinguish between them, as any economic model is after all an approximation to the 
true underlying model. Such a claim is certainly valid from neoclassic economics point of 
view. However, if we care for out of sample prediction, such as to predict how agents 
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will behave in an unfamiliar game setting, how policy changes will affect behavior, or 
how another population will respond to the same external settings, we do need to have a 
better understanding about the underlying learning process involved under different 
strategic settings. This idea is summarized succinctly in Salmon (2001). 
“If the goal of the research is to find a model that has a high in-sample 
prediction level, then the problem discussed here is not an issue. If the 
point, however, is to further our understanding of strategic choice, then 
this is a more serious problem. This is why there will be so much emphasis 
placed on accuracy of the models in identifying the true data generating 
process instead of simply providing statistically acceptable fits of the 
data.”   
Here we provide an alternative approach for identifying the underlying strategic 
learning process, a neuroeconomic approach. Our goal is to relate the game theoretical 
models to neural measures, in order to test competing hypotheses that constrain 
competing learning algorithms, and to further our understanding in strategic choices.  
 
1.2. A neuroeconomic approach to learning 
Evidences for learning in neuroscience 
The intimate relationship between brain and reward has been appreciated by 
neuroscientists since the accidental discovery of the mid-brain dopamine neurons in the 
1950s. In the seminal work by Olds and Milner (1954), they found that rats would 
repeatedly visit the locations where they received direct electrical stimulation of mid-
brain regions dense in dopamine neurons. It is also found by later studies that when rats 
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were allowed to press a foot lever to stimulate this particular brain region, they would do 
so in preference to food, drink, or mate.  Conversely, blocking dopamine has the effect of 
removing the reward contingent on an animal’s choices. For example, Berridge (1998) 
demonstrated the extinction of responding to food reward as if the reward is absent, when 
animal is deprived of dopamine.  
Over the past decades, researchers have further elucidated the role of this brain 
region in decision-making. A series of studies by Schultz and colleagues (1997) were 
particularly influential in moving beyond the relatively naïve hypothesis of reward 
encoding in mid-brain dopamine neurons. These single neuron recordings in monkeys 
used a classical conditioning task where monkeys learned to associate a stimulus (e.g., 
light) with a reward (e.g., juice).  Contrary to the simple reward encoding hypothesis, the 
dopaminergic neurons fired in response to reward delivery only in early trials.  Once the 
monkey learned the association between the light and juice, activity in the neurons shifted 
to the onset of the light. Moreover, the firing rate of the neurons fell below baseline if the 
light was followed by the omission of the juice reward (Figure 3).  
The TD reinforcement model provides a flexible framework for studying the brain 
mechanisms underlying a variety of conditions. Over the past decade, it has proved 
remarkable success in its application to the study of neural systems underlying decision-
making and learning. In particular, it forms one of the foundational results in the rapid 
growing field of neuroeconomics, and has been found to be robust across a range of 
species including humans and nonhuman primates as well as experimental conditions 
(Fiorillo, Tobler et al. 2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006; Rangel, Camerer et al. 
2008). For example, Figure 4 shows the result of an early study of brain regions that 
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Figure 3: Changes in dopaminergic neurons resembles reward prediction 
errors when monkeys performing a conditioning task to associate a 
stimulus with a reward. Raster plots demonstrate dopamine neuron’s 
activity with each row representing a trial, aligned to the time of 
conditioned stimulus (CS) or reward (R/ No R).  Histograms show the 
summed activities over each trial. (A) Dopaminergic neurons respond to 
the unexpected delivery of juice with a phasic spike of firing. (B) After 
conditioning the delivery of juice with the predictive light stimulus, 
reward is delivered as predicted, no reward prediction error occurs. The 
dopamine neuron is activated only by the reward-predicting stimulus but 
not by the reward delivery. (C) When reward is unexpected omitted, 
prediction error occurs. Dopaminergic neurons showed a pause in firing, 
below their standard background firing rate. Adapted from Schultz, 
Dayan et al. (1997) 
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Figure 4: Human ventral striatum (in particular, left putamen) responds to 
positive TD prediction errors caused by unpredictable juice delivery in a 
passive learning task. Adapted from McClure, Berns et al. (2003) 
responds to the TD prediction errors in a passive learning task.  In this study, McClure, et 
al. (2003) scanned human subjects while they underwent a classical conditioning 
paradigm in which associations were learned between visual stimuli (a flash of light) and 
the time of reward delivery (juice). Subjects were then exposed to low frequency of 
“error” trials, in which the delivery of reward is delayed beyond the time expected from 
the previous training session. They found that unpredicted delivery was associated with 
greater activities in some brain region (ventral striatum) than predicted reward delivery, 
which suggests that computations described by TD learning are expressed in the human 
brain during this learning task. 
 
Neuroeconomics at a glance 
Neuroeconomics is an interdisciplinary field of economics, neuroscience and 
psychology, which combines neural measurement technology, economic theories, 
experimental paradigms, as well as mathematical modeling. The field concerns with 
grounding microeconomic models and theories with neural measures, in order to build 
hypotheses that constrain alternative economic theories, and thus provide at a deeper 
level the empirical evaluations and distinctions among competing behavioral models as 
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well as empirical inspiration for economic theories to incorporate the more realistic 
psychological and neurological underpinnings.  
The underlying assumption in neuroeconomics is that behavioral choices are the 
results of certain information processing which involves brain activities. Hence neural 
signals can be used to test economic theories on what information is processed in the 
brain, how such processing takes place and how choices are decided (Sanfey, 
Loewenstein et al. 2006; Fehr and Camerer 2007; Camerer 2008; Harrison 2008; 
Krueger, Grafman et al. 2008; Bernheim 2009; Sobel 2009).   
To illustrate, consider a decision problem in a repeated matching penny game. 
Traditional economic models seek to identify the casual relation f (y | x,u)  of individual 
choices y (e.g. selecting head or tail) conditional on a vector of observed environmental 
variables x (e.g.  payoff structure, observed history of  previous choices) as well as latent 
variable  u  ( e.g. belief about what the other player will do ) under some axioms.  
To illustrate, consider an individual decision-making problems. Traditional 
economic models seek to identify the causal relation  of individual choices y (e.g. 
purchasing behavior) conditional on a vector of observed environmental variables x (e.g. 
prices, incomes etc.) under some axioms. Whereas unobserved variables such as moods, 
traits, memories, are treated as idiosyncratic noises orthogonal to the observed 
explanatory variable x. In contrast, neuroeconomics seeks to open the black box of the 
decision making process  (W. Glimcher, Camerer et al. 2008), by assuming there 
exists a computational decision algorithm at the brain level that takes external stimuli x as 
inputs and generates behavioral choices y as outputs, while at the same time producing 
neural signals z that is observable under neuroscientific methods. i.e.  and 
f (y | x)
f (y | x)
g(z, z ' | x)
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, where  and  are observed and unobserved neural signals respectively. This 
approach allows economists to derive testable hypotheses based on both neural and 
behavioral data, and conduct more stringent test on the underlying economic theories 
(Rustichini 2009).  which has been proven useful in clarifying some long standing 
behavioral paradoxes (Hsu, Bhatt et al. 2005), or adjudicating among different economic 
models which can explain the same pattern of choices (Knoch, Pascual-Leone et al. 
2006).  
 
1.3. Model-Based Integration of Behavioral, Neural, and Lesion Data 
My thesis aims to take an initial step toward providing such a framework by 
bringing together a group of experts in (1) the neuroeconomics of social and non-social 
decision-making (Hsu et al. 2005; Hsu et al. 2008), (2) neural modeling (Duque et al. 
2010), and (3) lesion patient studies of cognition and executive function (Barceló and 
Knight 2002; Beer et al. 2006). In particular, we will extend the RL framework and 
provide a model-based account of two fundamental components of goal-directed behavior 
in the social domain: (1) learning about the rewards and punishments available in the 
environment (the reward learning problem), and (2) forming mental models of other 
individuals in the decision context (the theory of mind problem). In this way, we seek to 
provide a unifying account of goal-directed behavior in both social and non-social 
settings. 
 
  
g '(c | z, z ') z z '
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Integration of Modeling and Experiments 
The overarching innovation of this study is the tight integration of computational 
modeling encompassing goal-directed behavior in both social and non-social settings, and 
testing the predictions generated using complementary experimental techniques. 
Experimentally, we will use fMRI of healthy adults and behavioral studies of focal brain 
lesion patients to triangulate the neural computations and the causal mechanisms. 
Bridging the different levels of explanation will be the computational model that captures 
the internal representations of the quantities, or “latent values”, that drive behavior, and 
will be used in a number of different ways. First, we will use the model, calibrated on 
observed behavior, to derive trial-by-trial regressors for use in our fMRI experiments. 
Second, the estimated parameters of the model themselves can be used to compare across 
health and diseased groups, or find subtypes of the diseased groups. Finally, the neural 
correlates and the behavioral estimates can be combined in order to find novel brain-
behavior markers of diseases. 
This approach has become widespread in certain areas, including much of reward 
learning (Daw et al. 2006; O'Doherty et al. 2007) and parts of impulsivity (Kable and 
Glimcher 2007; Balsam and Gallistel 2009) and risky decision-making (Tobler et al. 
2007; Hsu et al. 2009). It is comparatively rare in the social domain. The twin challenges 
here are generating models of sufficient predictive power and tractability to describe 
fundamental components of social behavior, and to have sufficient neurobiological 
plausibility that the putative internal quantities reflect biological reality, which is 
particularly challenging for fMRI studies (Behrens, Hunt et al. 2008; Behrens, Hunt et al. 
2009); Hsu et al. 2008). 
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Connecting RL and Game Theory 
The two core innovations that make our approach possible are: (1) connecting 
existing theoretical frameworks of reinforcement learning and behavioral game theory, 
and (2) development of experimental paradigms that taps into goal-directed behavior in 
the social domain and, at the same time, can be used across different experimental 
methodologies. The first feature allows us to leverage the behavioral realism of the 
behavioral game theory framework by building on top of the neurobiological realism of 
the RL framework. Specifically, we adapted behavioral models of social learning into a 
temporal-difference framework proposed for reward learning and decision-making 
(Rangel, Camerer et al. 2008). This is the critical step in generating trial-by-trial 
regressors necessary for model-based fMRI studies. We further verified the validity of 
the model with model-free measures of behavior (e.g., switch/stay). This gives a 
qualitative look at the data that serves as a “sanity check” of the model predictions. 
 
Novel Behavioral Paradigm 
We developed the second component by combining separate paradigms used in 
reward learning and social neuroscience, respectively. Subjects will be presented with a 
choice paradigm—a game—where outcomes are determined by both the choices of the 
subject and other(s) in the game. This is done using a novel multi-strategy competitive 
game that is amenable for computational modeling and optimized for statistical recovery 
of key parameters of the model. Furthermore, we adapted the paradigm to work equally 
well in a neuroimaging and lesion experimental setting by minimizing the cognitive 
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complexity of the interface that often accompany game theory paradigms. Specifically, 
we replaced the large matrix of numbers used in typical game theory studies, which can 
be unintuitive to even highly educated healthy subjects, with an interface that directly 
reflects the logic of the game. To manipulate the social context of the subjects’ behavior, 
we will borrow from the social neuroscience and neuroeconomics literature and vary the 
other players in the game between human and computer opponents (McCabe et al. 2001; 
Gallagher and Frith 2003). Furthermore, this paradigm may be further extended by 
incorporating features that have been profitably studied in the existing literature. This 
includes manipulating the moral status of the opponent (Delgado, Schotter et al. 2008), 
matching subjects against a single opponent to allow reputation building (King-Casas et 
al. 2005; Kishida et al. 2010), or developing computer algorithms that mimic human 
behavior. 
 
Bridging Existing Approaches to Goal-Directed Behavior 
Because we start with simple forms of social behavior that are tractable for both 
modeling and experimentation, our bottom-up approach can serve as a potential bridge 
between the large and comparatively well-developed literatures of reward learning on the 
one hand, and social exchange games on the other. The latter includes the highly popular 
games such as Trust (Delgado et al. 2005; King-Casas et al. 2005) and Ultimatum Games 
(Sanfey, Rilling et al. 2003). Indeed it was work in this tradition that first provided 
empirical support for the idea that social interaction can operate through a RL 
mechanisms as more basic types of rewards (King-Casas et al. 2005). However, because 
of the complexity of behavior arising from these games, and the substantial individual 
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differences, it is extremely challenging to develop models that offer a mechanistic 
understanding of the brain-behavior link. In contrast, drawing from both theoretical 
biology and game theory (Fudenberg and Levine 1998;  Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998), 
we will begin with perhaps the best-studied and most well-understood theoretical 
scenario for social interactions containing simple forms of mentalization. We envision 
that by alternatively stripping away and “scaling up” the social complexity of our 
experimental paradigm, we will be able to connect and interface directly the theoretical 
and experimental frameworks of both literatures. 
Finally, we should note that we by no means claim that this framework 
encompasses all, or even large proportion of social behavior and functioning. Rather, we 
argue that such a framework has to potential to do for goal- directed behavior in the 
social domain what it has demonstrated in the non-social counterpart. Given the limited 
state of our knowledge, even the small step we propose here constitutes a productive and 
substantial advance.  
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CHAPTER 2 
NEURAL CORRELATES UNDERLYING STRATEGIC 
LEARNING 
  
2.1 Introduction 
Notions of equilibrium are central to theories of strategic behavior in the 
biological and social sciences where individuals must take into account not only available 
rewards and punishments but also behavior of other intelligent agents. It has long been 
recognized, however, that equilibria do not emerge spontaneously, but rather through 
some adaptive process whereby organisms evolve or learn over time (Fudenberg and K. 
Levine 1998; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). In the social domain, specifically behavioral 
game theory, this is referred to as strategic learning, and has been the subject of intense 
study both theoretically and empirically. Only recently however are we beginning to 
understand the neural mechanisms and computations involved (Barraclough, Conroy et 
al. 2004; Hampton, Bossaerts et al. 2008; Lee 2008). Here we study the neural systems 
underlying strategic learning in a stylized but well-characterized setting of a population 
with many anonymously interacting agents, which provides a natural model for settings 
such as commuters in traffic or bargaining in bazaars (Fudenberg and K. Levine 1998). 
More importantly, it minimizes the role of reputation and higher-order belief 
considerations, and has served as a basic building block for a number of models in 
evolutionary biology and game theory (Fudenberg and K. Levine 1998; Hofbauer and 
Sigmund 1998). 
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We considered three classes of models commonly invoked to explain behavior in 
this population setting—reinforcement learning (RL), belief-based (BB) learning, and 
their hybrid, experience-weighted attraction (EWA) (S. Sutton and G. Barto 1998; 
Camerer 2010). RL models, which seek to understand how choices are shaped by rewards 
and punishments, were among the first to be applied to strategic learning, and explain a 
number of important features of the data at the behavioral (Mookherjee and Sopher 1994; 
Roth and Erev 1995; Mookherjee and Sopher 1997) and neural levels (Barraclough, 
Conroy et al. 2004; Dorris and Glimcher 2004). This approach is particularly appealing 
as there is much evidence of a temporal difference (TD) form of RL at the neural level, 
whereby learning is driven by a reward prediction error defined as the difference between 
expected and received reward (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997; Rangel, Camerer et al. 2008). 
Despite these successes, standard RL models provide an incomplete account of strategic 
learning even in the simple population setting, as they have no notion of the actions and 
beliefs of other agents and can be consequently exploited in a variety of competitive 
settings (Camerer 2010). In contrast, BB models require players to form and update first-
order beliefs regarding the likelihood of future actions of opponents through experience. 
Specifically, these models posit that players select their actions strategically by best 
responding to their beliefs about opponents’ future strategies. Although belief formation 
can take any number of forms, such models typically assume that players use some 
weighted history of opponents’ choices as basis for their beliefs (Camerer and Ho 1999). 
In principle, reinforcement and belief learning are not mutually exclusive. Hybrid 
models have been proposed to combine RL and BB models. Here we adopt EWA, a 
nonlinear hybrid of RL and BB models that nests both (Camerer and Ho 1999). At the 
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behavioral level, the hybrid model has been found to outperform both standard RL and 
BB across a wide range of games (Camerer and Ho 1999; Ho, Camerer et al. 2007). 
However, it is unclear whether the behavioral superiority is the result of a single learning 
signal at the neural level incorporating both reinforcement and belief inputs, or an 
interaction of dissociable signals. Recent work in related fields—primarily reward 
learning and social cognitive neuroscience—provide converging evidence for distinct 
systems that underlie reinforcement processing, compared to those that represent mental 
models of the environment or other intelligent agents (Amodio, 2006; Behrens, Hunt et 
al. 2009). Based on these findings, we hypothesize that there exists distinct neuronal 
populations encoding RL and BB prediction errors, and that both can be represented 
under a TD framework. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief background 
introduction including the quantitative learning models, and the experimental paradigm 
we borrowed from game theory. Then in Section 2.3 we introduce experimental and 
computational methods employed in the study. Section 2.4 presents the major behavioral 
and section 2.5 presents the neuroimaging results.  We conclude with a discussion of our 
results and their relevance to the various disciplines in Section 2.6.  
 
2.2 Computational Modeling of Strategic Learning 
I consider here three classes computational models of strategic learning: (1) 
reinforcement learning, (2) belief-based learning and (3) EWA learning. All three models 
assume that a decision-maker chooses an action from a pool of actions based on some 
subjective value assigned, and that these values are updated on each trial according to 
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some prediction errors. They differ, however, in the hypotheses of how prediction errors 
are computed over the course of learning.   
Reinforcement learning hypothesizes that prediction errors are computed based on 
agents’ received payoffs (McClure, Berns et al. 2003; O'Doherty, Critchley et al. 2003; 
Daw, O'Doherty et al. 2006).  More specifically, it assumes that actions that yielded the 
most reward in the recent past will receive higher subjective valuation and hence be 
selected with higher chance in the future. In contrast to reinforcement learning, belief-
based learning posits that individuals form beliefs about the behavior of other players, 
and then maximize the subjective value by best responding to these beliefs. Because 
beliefs are not directly observable, these models typically make assumptions about the 
mapping from history of opponent play to beliefs (e.g., Fudenberg and K. Levine 1998).  
For example, the well-known fictitious play model posits that players form beliefs about 
the opponent based on the average of the opponent’s history of play (Fudenberg and 
Kreps 1993).  
The third model we consider is EWA (Camerer and Ho 1999; Ho, Camerer et al. 
2007).  A key insight of EWA is the recasting of belief-based learning into reinforcement 
learning using foregone payoffs. This is not only theoretically appealing but also 
biologically plausible, as simple forms of fictive errors have been found in both human 
and non-human primate studies of reward learning (Lohrenz, McCabe et al. 2007; 
Hayden, Pearson et al. 2009; Thevarajah, Mikulic et al. 2009). EWA has the advantages 
of (1) providing a general framework that contains both reinforcement and belief-based 
learning as special cases, and (2) allowing for a more sophisticated way to account for the 
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depreciation of the past by separating the discount of the past experience and the discount 
of the past subjective values.  
For example, in EWA, we denote the values as the “attraction” for player 
! 
i  to 
play strategy 
! 
k , after observing the previous 
! 
t  rounds of play, i.e., 
! 
Aik (t) . The evolution of 
the attractions is governed by three parameters. Two of the parameters, 
! 
"  and 
! 
" , control 
the depreciation of 
! 
Aik (t)  and the strength of past experiences, captured by 
! 
N (t) . For 
example, if the player believes his opponent is a fast adaptor, he will adapt fast too.  That 
is, he will have a small 
! 
"  that depreciates past attractions faster. In contrast, 
! 
"  is the 
discount rate for the strength of past experience 
! 
N (t) , and hence controls the influence of 
the initial attractions. If 
! 
"  is large, the initial attractions will wear off quickly.  Finally, 
parameter 
! 
"  is the weight between foregone payoffs and actual payoffs when updating 
attractions. This parameter can be interpreted as a psychological inclination toward 
foregone payoff learning, which is equivalent to belief-based learning (Camerer and Ho 
1999). 
Begin with initial attractions over strategies Aik (0)  and initial experience 
! 
N (0) , 
which can either be estimated as free parameters or calculated from first period data 
(Roth and Erev 1995; Saxe and Haushofer 2008), 
! 
Aik (t)  and 
! 
N (t)  evolve according to the 
following equations: 
Aik (t) =
! !N(t "1) !Aik (t "1)+" i sik, s"i (t)( )
N(t) , if si
k = si (t)
! !N(t "1) !Aik (t "1)+" !# i sik, s"i (t)( )
N(t) , if si
k # si (t)
$
%
&
&&
'
&
&
&
N(t) = ! !N(t "1)+1, t (1 .
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Attractions can be further rewritten a form conducive for computational 
estimation by rewriting in the form of: 
! 
Aik (t) =
" #N (t $1) # Aik (t $1) + % + (1$%) # I (sik ,si (t))[ ] # & i (sik ,s$i (t))
N (t)  
where 
! 
I (sik ,si (t))  is equal to 1 if and only if player 
! 
i  played strategy 
! 
k  in the previous 
round 
! 
t . Otherwise, 
! 
I (sik ,si (t))  is equal to zero. When 
! 
I (sik ,si (t))  takes the value 1 the actual 
payoff is updated, whereas when it’s equal to 0 the fictive payoff is updated.   
I also estimated reinforcement and belief-based learning models as two restricted 
versions of the above EWA model.  When 
! 
" = 0  and 
! 
N (0) = 1, EWA reduces to the 
reinforcement model, similarly when 
! 
" = 1  and 
! 
" =# , it reduces to the belief-based 
learning model.  
To convert attractions into choices, we use a logit or softmax function to calculate 
the probability of player 
! 
i  playing strategy 
! 
k  in the next rounds, i.e.  
! 
pik (t +1) =
! 
e"Aik (t )
e"Ail (t )l=1L# ,  
where 
! 
"  is a measurement of subjects’ sensitivity to attractions.  
 
Statistical Properties of Experimental Paradigm 
Statistically, strategic learning models, particularly EWA, place high demands on 
the quality and quantity of data. Previous econometric studies have found that games with 
many choices have superior statistical properties than smaller games (Salmon 2001), 
which appear borne out in experimental studies (Erev and Rapoport 1998; Feltovich 
2000). This is notable in that the few previous studies of neural basis of strategic 
learning, in both humans and non-human animals, have used 2x2 games, the smallest 
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non-trivial games (Dorris and Glimcher 2004; Hampton, Bossaerts et al. 2008; Lee 
2008). Besides the consideration from statistical estimation point of view, the foregone 
payoff and the received payoff are highly negatively correlated in such small games with 
only two possible outcomes given what opponent has selected. This makes it impossible 
to separate the signals associated with foregone payoffs and realized payoffs.  
Games with many strategies and possible outcomes, however, can take a long 
time to play and to process cognitively. In the experimental economics literature on 
learning, sessions exceeding an hour are typical, and up to two hours are not unusual 
(Rapoport and Amaldoss 2000; Camerer, Ho et al. 2003).  Such durations are clearly 
unfeasible in the context of neuroimaging studies.  The solutions are: (1) to acquire data 
for a fewer number of rounds, or (2) complete part of the behavioral experiment outside 
the scanner.  Neither is ideal.  Another serious concern is the extended duration of the 
decisions themselves, often-exceeding 10 sec, in some cases minutes. This makes it 
difficult to implement event-related analyses of the functional data.  We believe that these  
 
Figure 5: The patent race game. Players are given an endowment to 
invest (gray squares). Player who invests more receives the potential 
prize (green squares) plus portion of her endowment not invested.  Player 
who invests less receives only the portion of her endowment not 
invested.  In case of tie neither player receives the prize.  Compare (A) 
the standard representation of the patent race game with (B) our 
alternative.   
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factors signals in previous studies (Lee, McGreevy et al. 2005; Hampton, Bossaerts et al. 
2008). In contrast, we show in our preliminary data strong evidence for the existence of 
such regions. 
To overcome these challenges, we used the “patent race game”, first studied 
experimentally by Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000). This game is simple in motivation but 
rich in the strategic nuances and the patterns of behavior that it can generate. In the game, 
two players are randomly matched from a large pool of players at the beginning of each 
round and compete for a prize by choosing an investment (in integer amounts) from their 
respective endowments. The player who invests more wins the prize and the other loses. 
In the event of a tie, both lose the prize. Players keep the part of their endowment that is 
not invested. In the particular payoff structure that we use, the prize size is 10, and 
players are of two types: Strong and Weak. The Strong player has 5 units to invest, 
resulting in the strategy set 
! 
{0,1,2,3,4,5} , whereas the Weak player has 4 units to invest, 
with a resulting strategy set of 
! 
{0,1,2,3,4}  (Figure 5).  The large strategy space of this 6x5 
game improves the recovery of key parameters in learning models (Salmon 2001). 
Theoretical game theory predicts that the game has a unique mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium in which strong players invest five 60% of the time, one and three 20% of the 
time respectively, and weak players invest zero 60% of the time, two or four 20% of the 
time.  
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2.3 Methods 
Experimental Design 
We redesign the interface of the patent race game by taking the standard matrix 
form representation that contains 60 elements and replacing it with a display that directly 
reflects the logic of the game. This speeded up game play considerably. For example, 
subjects took over 2 hours to run through 160 rounds of this particular game (Rapoport 
and Amaldoss 2000). In contrast, our preliminary data show that subjects were able to 
complete 160 rounds in around 30 minutes. Including typical inter-stimulus intervals 
(ISI) values of fMRI experiments, almost all subjects were able to complete the scanning 
session in 40 minutes.  
The experiment contains two sessions, a behavioral session and a neuroimaging 
session. 16 subjects participated the behavioral session. In the beginning of each round 
subjects are randomly and anonymously matched. They played 2 sessions of 80 rounds 
each to counterbalance the ordering effect. In the neuroimaging session, however, the 
opponent choices are drawn from a pool of the original 16 subjects who participated in a 
behavioral experiment (we will refer to these as pool players).  These neuroimaging 
subjects played in the same sequence as pool players.  That is, if the scanner subject is 
playing in round 60, the opponent’s choice will be drawn randomly from round 60 of one 
of the pool player. Similar to the behavioral session, neuroimaging subjects also played 2 
sessions, each of 80 rounds. 
This is done for two reasons. First, the random matching protocol requires a large 
number of subjects to ensure that the probability of repeated interaction is small.  
Otherwise, subjects may be able to develop higher order strategies that depend on 
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reputation, which complicates the analysis considerably. Second, random matching 
makes running real-time experiments with opponents impractical. For example, over 200 
subjects will be used to acquire 20 neuroimaging sessions with 10 players, a relatively 
small group. Our current method preserves the dynamics of the evolution of play in the 
experiment, as well as controls for the inter-group variation that would arise if we used 
more than one group of pool subjects.    
The timeline of experiment is as follows. After a fixation screen of a random 
duration, distributed uniformly random between 4-8s, subjects are presented with the 
patent race game for between 1-2s (Figure 6A).  Subjects are allowed to make a decision 
once the dashed line turns from red to gray (Figure 6B).   Subjects input the decision by 
pressing a button mapped to the desired investment amount.  The possible investments 
are  for the strong player and  for weak.  All decisions are self-
paced. After 2-6s, if the investment amount is strictly greater than that of the opponent, 
the subject wins the prize (Figure 6C).  Otherwise the subject loses the prize (Figure 6D).  
In either case the subject keeps the portion of the endowment that was not invested.  
 
Subjects 
A total of 35 healthy volunteers (19 female) were recruited from Neuroeconomics 
Lab subject pool at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC). Informed 
consent was obtained as approved by the Internal Review Board at UIUC. Subjects had a 
mean age: 23.3 +/- 4.6 years, ranging 19-47. 5 subjects were excluded from the study due 
to excessive motion, and 3 due to repeating the same strategy for more than 95% of the 
trials during the experiment.   
! 
{0,1,2,3,4,5} {0,1, 2,3, 4}
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Figure 6: Timeline of experiment. After a fixation screen of between 4-8 
sec, (A) the subject is presented with the patent race game for between 1-
2sec, (B) the subject is able to make a self-paced decision once the 
dashed line turns from red to gray by pressing buttons mapped to the 
investment amounts.  After 2-6sec, the opponent’s choice is revealed. (C) 
If the investment amount is strictly greater than that of the opponent, the 
subject wins the prize.  (D) Otherwise the subject loses the prize.  In 
either case the subject keeps the portion of the endowment that was not 
invested.   
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Before entering the scanner, subjects were given instructions and completed a 
quiz to ensure comprehension of the game. They were informed that they would be paid 
the average payoff from a randomly chosen 40 rounds from each session, plus a $10 
show up fee.  
 
Estimation Method 
To evaluate how closely the three learning models capture subjects’ behavior, we 
fit each model to behavior separately. In particular, we perform both pooled and 
individual-level estimation. For pooled estimation, we aggregate observations from all 
subjects conditional on their roles and then fit the choice data by maximizing the log 
likelihood of the observed choices over rounds for subject . That is, . To 
estimate the model, we conduct a grid search over a large range of values for all free 
parameters, since the likelihood function is not globally concave.  
The pooled estimation essentially assumes that a single, shared set of parameters 
can explain the behavior from all subjects’ with the same endowment.  Although pooled 
estimation is more robust in general, it removes the individual differences in learning that 
is important for between subject analysis in neuroimaging and may bias behavioral 
estimates due to heterogeneity (Wilcox 2006).  Therefore, we investigate fully 
individualized fits with separate parameters for each subject. The primary challenge of 
individual-level estimation is the relatively small sample size compared to the number of 
free parameters. We approach this problem with two methods. First we apply the self-
tuning estimation as introduced in Ho et al. (2007). The psychologically less interesting 
parameters such as ,  and initial attractions are set to be fixed values.   is 
! 
i log pisi (t ) (t)( )t!i!
N (0) !
! 
"
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replaced by a function of past experience as in Ho et al. (2007). Different from self-
tuning EWA, however,  is kept as a free parameter in our estimation, because it 
captures the individual differences in weighting the respective learning processes critical 
to the neuroimaging analysis. Second, we also conduct partially joint estimates across 
different roles for each subject.  These methods appeared quite robust and yielded similar 
results.    
 
Conversion to Temporal-Difference Model 
Having characterized subjects’ behavior computationally, we use the best-fitting 
estimates of each model to generate regressors containing prediction errors for each 
subject on each trial. This requires us to convert the standard quantitative learning models 
into the TD forms, where reward predictions and prediction errors are separated into 
different components. TD models have been highly popular in computational 
neuroscience, and forms the bedrock of much of our current understanding of how the 
brain learns.  EWA can be transformed into the following forms for updating attractions 
under the restriction of ! ! ! . This is a mild restriction, and it has been shown to have 
little effect on empirical fit across a number of datasets (Ho, Camerer and Chong 2007). 
 
In words, if player  played strategy  in the previous round, the new EWA 
attraction  is the previous attraction plus the discounted prediction error.  If strategy 
 was not played in the previous round, the new EWA attraction  is the previous 
! 
"
  
! 
Aik (t) =
Aik (t "1) +
1
N (t) # si
k (t),s"i (t)( ) " Ak (t "1){ } if sik = si (t)
Aik (t "1) +
1
N (t) $ % # si
k (t),s"i (t)( ) " Ak (t "1){ } if sik & si (t)
' 
( 
) 
* 
) 
                            
Reward Prediction
! " # $ #                                                       
Prediction Error
! " # # # # # # $ # # # # # # 
! 
i
! 
k
! 
Aik (t)
! 
k
! 
Aik (t)
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attraction plus the discounted prediction error multiplied by the foregone payoff 
parameter.  In contrast, in the standard TD model the valuation of unchosen strategy  is 
assumed to remain the same or decay at some depreciation rate.   This is clear in our 
reinforcement learning TD model below.  Finally, we include the belief-based model 
equation.  The intuition here is similar to the EWA model, except all prediction errors are 
weighted equally. 
 
 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Functional MR images were obtained for each subject using a 3T Siemens Allegra 
scanner located at the research-dedicated Beckman Imaging Center (BIC) at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  Images were acquired using echo-planar 
T2* images with BOLD (blood oxygenation-level-dependent) contrast, and angled 30 
degrees with respect to the AC-PC line to minimize susceptibility artifacts in the OFC. 
MR imaging settings are as follows: repetition time (TR) = 2000ms; echo time (TE) = 
40ms; slice thickness = 3mm yielding in a 64x64x32 matrix (3mm x 3mm x 3mm); flip 
angle = 90 degs; FOV read = 220mm; FOV phase = 100mm, series order: interleaved. 
High-resolution structural T1-weighted scans (1mm x 1mm x 1mm) were acquired using 
a MPRage sequence. Visual stimuli were viewable by means of a mirror mounted on the 
MRI head coil and responses will be acquired via an MRI-safe button response pad 
(Neuroscan, Inc.).   
 
! 
k
! 
RL:                Aik (t) = Aik (t "1) + (1"#)
1
1"# $ si
k (t),s"i (t)( ) " Ak (t "1)
% 
& 
' 
( 
) 
* 
BB :               Aik (t) = Aik (t "1) +
1
N (t) $ si
k (t),s"i (t)( ) " Ak (t "1){ }.
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fMRI Data Analysis 
Imaging data was preprocessed using SPM2, and included, in order, slice time 
correction, motion correction, coregistration, normalization to the MNI template and 
smoothing of the functional data with an 8mm kernel. Random effects analyses were 
done in SPM2 by specifying a separate general linear model for each subject and pooled 
at the second level. First all images were high-pass filtered in the temporal domain (filter 
width 128s) and autocorrelation of the hemodynamic responses was modeled as an AR(1) 
process.   
Functional imaging data was analyzed using standard GLM procedures.  In our 
GLM model, each trial is modeled as two events: the decision event and the feedback 
event. Regressors are constructed by using the trial-by-trial output from the TD form of 
the best-fit behavioral models. The decision event is associated with choice probabilities, 
which can be regarded as relative reward predictions controlled for time influence. The 
feedback event is associated with prediction errors for chosen actions. Regressors were 
then convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and entered into a 
regression analysis against each subject’s fMRI data using SPM 2. The regression fits of 
each computational signal from each individual subject were taken into random-effects 
group analysis.  
More specifically, for the TD transformation, prediction error for reinforcement 
learning model is , whereas   for the EWA model it is .  For 
belief-based learning model, however, prediction error is defined slightly differently. 
Instead of using the absolute prediction errors 
 
, we find it is crucial to use the 
prediction error for the chosen action relative to the fictive errors in the same trial. The 
! 
( 11"# $ it " vi(t"1))
! 
(" it # vi(t#1))
! 
(" it # vi(t#1))
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reason is the following: the conventional TD model is based on the action-outcome 
evaluation system, which focuses on reinforcing the associated outcome for each action. 
The core idea for belief-based learning model, however, is that an action should not be 
only evaluated by its directly associated outcome but also by the fictive outcomes 
conditional on opponent’s choices. Hence absolute prediction error fails to capture the 
essence of belief-based learning model. For example, in our game the strong player is 
guaranteed with 10 units of payoff by investing 5 regardless of his opponent’s 
investments. As a result his absolute prediction error for investing 5 will always be 0. 
However, he might regret for investing 5 when observing his opponent invested 0, and be 
relieved if the opponent invested 4. In other words, the relative prediction error for 
investing 5 when the opponent invests 0 is lower, which will in turn reduce the likelihood 
of him investing 5 in the future.  
A few forms of relative prediction errors are considered in this study, including 
orthogonalized prediction errors for chosen actions against the maximum fictive error in 
the same trial, orthogonalized prediction errors for chosen action against mean prediction 
errors for all actions in the same trial, the exponential ratio between prediction error for 
the chosen action and the mean prediction errors for all actions , and 
the exponential ratio between prediction error for the chosen action the maximum 
prediction error in the same trial, . Regardless of how the relative 
prediction errors are calculated for belief-based learning, the results were robustly 
similar.  
! 
exp(" it # vi(t#1))
exp( (" kt # vk(t#1)k$ )
! 
exp(" it # vi(t#1))
exp(" tmax # v(t#1)max )
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In the rest of the paper, we adopted orthogonalized prediction errors for chosen 
actions against the maximal fictive error in the same trial as relative prediction errors for 
belief-based learning, unless otherwise specified. 
 
2.4 Behavioral Results 
Aggregate Behavioral Results 
To measure the effectiveness of our behavioral protocol, we compared both 
aggregate choices between (1) our neuroimaging subjects, (2) our behavioral subjects, 
and (3) Rapoport and Amaldoss’s (2000) original experiment (Table 1).  We found no 
evidence that the neuroimaging protocols substantially affected players’ behavior.  
 
Individual Level Behavioral Estimates 
To address which of the three learning models most closely capture subjects’ 
behavior, we fit each model to behavior separately and compare the goodness of fit. 
Table 2 shows median individual-level estimates with associated first and third quartiles. 
Notably, parameter 
! 
"  is significantly higher in median or mean individual level estimates 
than the pooled estimate reported in Rapport (2000), reflecting downward bias induced 
through heterogeneity (Wilcox, 2006). 
The results of behavioral estimation suggest a couple of important features. 
Firstly, consistent with previous empirical studies, EWA model on average outperforms 
both reinforcement and belief-based in fitting the behavioral data in both in-sample tests 
using the Bayesian information criterion penalizing for number of free parameters 
(Figure 7A), as well as out-of-sample tests (Figure 7B). Figure 8 uses simulated play 
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based on best-fitting estimates to show a subject who clearly exhibits both aspects of 
reinforcement and belief-based learning. The notable aspects of this plot is that 
reinforcement model misses the increased probability of investing 4 in rounds 20-40 
(Figure 8C), but this is captured by the belief-based learning model (Figure 8D).  On the 
other hand, the belief-based learning model overestimates the probability that strategy 4  
   Empirical Distributions 
Role Investment Equilibrium 
Prediction 
Matrix 
Form 
Behavioral 
Session 
Neuroimaging 
Session 
Strong 0 0% 1% 0% 1% 
 1 20% 17% 14% 18% 
 2 0% 5% 6% 10% 
 3 20% 9% 13% 11% 
 4 0% 13% 25% 16% 
 5 60% 55% 43% 45% 
Iak 0 60% 55% 49% 49% 
 1 0% 3% 3% 4% 
 2 20% 6% 10% 7% 
 3 0% 14% 10% 14% 
 4 20% 22% 28% 27% 
Table 1: Comparison of Nash equilibrium predictions and empirical 
distributions from (1) Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000), (2) our behavioral 
experiment, and (3) our neuroimaging experiment. Empirical distribution 
is proportion of all players’ choices over all rounds.   
 
Model ! " # 
reinforcement 
learning 
0* .94 
(.86, .96) 
.04 
(.02, .07) 
belief-based learning  
1* .95 
(.83, .98) 
.60 
(.23, 2.11) 
EWA 
.46 
(.29, .69) 
.71 
(.53, .81) 
.51 
(.32, .70) 
Table 2: Median individual level estimates.  Parentheses contain first and 
third quartile of empirical distribution. 
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will be played in rounds 40-60 (Figure 8D), whereas this is not the case with the 
reinforcement model (Figure 8C).  These are precisely the features of the two models that 
EWA combines (Figure 8B). 
Second, individual variability in learning was further quantified using the 
estimated EWA parameter !!, which captures the relative weights placed on RL and BB 
learning (Figure 7C). Crucially for interpretation of neuroimaging results, we found that 
behavior in the game was driven by participants engaging in both RL and BB learning at  
 
 
Figure 7: Behavioral results. (A) BIC comparison of in-sample model fit 
showed that EWA fits behavioral choices significantly better than RL and 
BB models (! ! !!!", paired t-test, two-tailed).  (B) EWA also had 
superior out-of-sample predictive power (! ! !!!", paired t-test, two-
tailed). Error bars are SEM. (C) Individual variation in the relative 
weights placed on RL and BB learning can be captured using 
individualized EWA parameter !!. That is, as ! increases, behavioral fit 
of BB learning improves relative to that of the RL (Pearson ! ! !!"! ! !!!!", two-tailed). 
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Figure 8: Comparison of empirical frequency and model fits for a subject 
predicted to exhibit both reinforcement learning and belief-based 
learning ( ). (A) Empirical frequency of play calculated using a 
15 round window, (B-D) Estimated probability of play with 
reinforcement learning, belief-based learning, and EWA models. 
 
the individual level, rather than a mixture of distinct segments of pure RL and BB 
learners. That is, individual !! values were distributed along the unit interval rather than 
clustered at the boundaries as would be expected with distinct segments of pure RL and 
BB players (Figure 7C, Table 2). Furthermore, this variation allowed us to use !! as a 
between-subject measure in subsequent neuroimaging analysis. 
 
Correlation of Prediction Error Regressors 
After obtaining the best-fitting estimates for each model, we convert the models 
into corresponding TD forms (see 2.3 for details) to compute corresponding model 
generated prediction error signals for each subject in each trial. Table 3 presents the 
correlation coefficients between these prediction error signals derived from 
! 
" = 0.47
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reinforcement, belief-based, and EWA. As shown in Table 3, the correlation between the 
prediction errors of reinforcement and belief-based learning is quite low (mean Pearson 
). This is especially important when these prediction error signals are entered as 
regressors into our neuroimaging data analysis. The statistical separation between the 
model-generated learning signals indicates the potential to disentangle the unique 
contributions of the different types of learning signals. The correlation of reinforcement 
and belief-based learning with EWA is also as expected; given the two are nested models 
within EWA.  
 
 RL BB EWA 
RL - (.16) (.10) 
BB .28 - (.18) 
EWA .63 .40 - 
Table 3: Correlation coefficient between the prediction errors from 
different learning models. Parentheses contain standard deviations for the 
correlation coefficients. 
 
 
2.5 Neuroimaging Results 
RL and BB Prediction Errors 
To relate the learning algorithm to brain activity, we use the trial to trial 
prediction error signals generated by the learning models as regressors on BOLD signals 
acquired at the time of the outcome, using statistical parametric mapping (SPM) to 
identify brain regions in which neural activity was significantly correlated with the 
model’s internal signals.  
First we look for brain regions that respond to the reinforcement prediction errors. 
This is the standard TD reinforcement error signal found in many previous studies of 
! 
" # 0.28
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reward learning (McClure, Berns et al. 2003; O'Doherty, Dayan et al. 2004). We find that 
the reinforcement prediction error signal correlates with activity in the ventral striatum 
(putamen) bilaterally (Figure 9A), consistent with many previous findings implicating 
this area in TD error encoding. 
Next we search for regions showing responses consistent with the prediction error 
signal from belief-based learning. Two versions of prediction error signals are 
considered. The first one is Cournot error, which is the one-period regret, defined as the 
difference between the highest possible payoff and the received payoff. The second one is 
the belief-based prediction error signal derived from the dynamic belief-based learning 
model introduced in part 2.2. We find that Cournot error appears to be correlated only 
with activity in the bilateral putamen (Figure 9B), whereas the prediction errors from the 
belief-based learning model significantly correlate with the activity of both the bilateral 
putamen and a large region that extends across the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). (Figure 9C).   
We then examined the individual differences in the degree of belief-based 
learning within our subject group, by comparing the difference in the estimated value of 
 obtained from individual EWA estimations and correlating that with neural activity 
elicited only by the belief-based prediction error signal.  A significant between-subject 
correlation is found in the ACC and part of the mPFC. This result suggests that among 
subjects who assign higher weights to belief-based learning, the prediction error signals 
derived from their belief-based model correlated better with their neural activities in the 
ACC and the mPFC. The scatter plot in the lower right panel of Figure 9C shows this is 
indeed the case.   
! 
"
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Figure 9: (A) Activation of the bilateral putamen in response to 
prediction error signals in reinforcement learning model (p < 0.001 
uncorrected, cluster size  > 10). (B) Activation of the bilateral putamen in 
response to prediction error signals in Cournot model (p < 0.001 
uncorrected, cluster size  > 10). (C) Significant activation of the medial 
prefrontal cortex and the bilateral putamen to belief-based prediction 
error  (p < 0.001 uncorrected, cluster size  > 10). Brain behavior 
correlation of the 
! 
"  parameter estimated behaviorally against the fMRI 
estimates at ACC (Pearson = 0.66, p < 0.001).   
 
 
Figure 10: Robustness check for orthogonalization between RL and BB 
models. (A) BB relative prediction errors after orthogonalization against 
RL prediction errors. (p<0.001, uncorrected , cluster size k > 10 voxels). 
(B) RL prediction errors after orthogonalization against BB relative 
prediction errors. (P<0.0001, uncorrected, cluster size k > 10 voxels). 
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We tested the robustness of the result in the following ways. Firstly, we 
simultaneously included the reinforcement prediction error and the orthogonalized belief-
based prediction error in the model with both regressors time-locked to the moment when 
outcome is revealed. We verified that the result is robust against the variation of 
regression models thanks to the low correlation between the prediction error signals from 
respective learning models (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 11: Robustness check for the notion of relative belief-based 
prediction errors. (A) The orthogonalized prediction errors from chosen 
action against average prediction errors for all available actions in the 
same trial. (P<0.001, uncorrected, k>10)  (B) Exponential ratio between 
the prediction error for chosen action and the maximal prediction error 
among all prediction errors for available actions in the same trial. 
(P<0.005, uncorrected, k>10) 
 
Secondly, we verified that the result for the belief based prediction error does not 
depends on the specific notion of relative prediction error we used. We therefore tested 
the following two alternative definitions of relative prediction errors: the orthogonalized 
prediction errors from chosen action against average prediction errors for all available 
actions in the same trial as well as the exponential ratio between the prediction error for 
chosen action and the maximal prediction error among all prediction errors for available 
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actions in the same trial. As shown in Figure 11, same brain regions respond to those 
notions of relative belief-based prediction error signals. 
 
Unitary vs. Dual System Test  
Having verified the spatial segregation in brain regions underlying the RL and BB 
prediction errors, we next explored the presence of a unified hybrid prediction error. 
Being a hybrid model, such prediction errors are by construction correlated with both RL 
and BB prediction errors. As in the behavioral results, however, if the true model of the 
underlying neural activity was a single hybrid prediction error, the hybrid prediction error 
should fit better than either RL or BB alone. In particular, the putamen would appear to 
be an obvious candidate if the brain encoded a hybrid prediction error given its 
involvement in both RL and BB prediction errors. In order to test this conjecture, next we 
searched for brain regions in which neural activity was significantly correlated with the 
EWA learning signals. Figure 12 contains the brain regions where the neural signals 
covariate with the EWA prediction error signals, which fails to support the hypothesis for 
putamen as the “EWA region”, as the same array of regions were implicated in the hybrid 
as was in BB and RL prediction errors. 
To test this formally, we first searched for brain regions showing a significantly 
better fit to the joint RL and BB prediction errors. We orthogonalized both RL and BB 
learning prediction error signals against the hybrid prediction error signal and conducted 
a F-test with the two orthogonalized regressors. We found that RL and BB had additional 
explanatory power, controlling for EWA, in the bilateral putamen and rACC (Figure 
13A). In contrast, in the reverse analysis, we did not find the orthogonalized hybrid   
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Figure 12: EWA prediction error signal. Up: Glass brain and section of 
bilateral putamen rACC activation in response to EWA prediction error 
(! ! !!!!" uncorrected, cluster size ! ! !"). Down: neural betas with 
respect to reinforcement, belief and EWA prediction errors at three ROIs 
defined by 8-mm sphere at the peak of EWA activation clusters (right 
putamen: 14, 7, -7, left putamen: -14, 7, -10, rACC: 10, 56, -4). 
 
 
Figure 13: (A) Orthogonalized reinforcement and belief learning 
prediction errors remain significantly correlated with putamen and rACC 
activity (! ! !!!!" uncorrected, ! ! !"), whereas (B) orthogonalized 
EWA prediction errors showed no significant correlation in these regions 
(! ! !!!!" uncorrected, ! ! !").    
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prediction error correlated with activity in any of the regions traditionally associated with 
decision-making and learning.  That is, the hybrid prediction error did not have extra 
explanatory power, controlling for RL and BB, except in a small area of the visual cortex 
(Figure 13B). This is the case even at a liberal threshold of p < 0.01, uncorrected. Taken 
together, the above evidence rejects the hypothesis of a single-process hybrid prediction 
error in the brain.  
We checked the validity of the above test in a number of ways.  First we 
addressed the concern that after orthogonalizing against both RL and BB prediction 
errors, the hybrid prediction errors would be pure noisy signals, which would be 
particularly true if the hybrid prediction error was a simple linear combination of RL and 
BB prediction errors. We examined the correlation between the orthogonalized and the 
unorthogonalized EWA prediction errors for each subject playing each role. The average 
correlation coefficient was around 0.40 (p < 0.05), suggesting that the orthogonalized 
hybrid EWA prediction error signals preserved a substantial portion of the unique share 
of variance after taking away the shares from RL and BB learning signals. 
Next we verified that the non-activation of the orthogonalized EWA prediction 
errors is not due to the over-penalization of EWA by orthogonalizing its prediction errors 
twice against RL and BB. We applied the similar orthogonalization strategy to RL and 
BB prediction errors respectively (i.e. orthogonalized RL prediction error against both 
EWA and BB prediction errors, and orthogonalized BB against both RL and EWA 
prediction errors). Their activation regions are overlaid with the unorthogonalized EWA 
activation regions in Figure 14. 
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Possible Mediating System for the Multiple Prediction errors 
Further analysis is conducted on the between-subject variability in the degree to 
which the dual-process is mediated.  Because subjects who have interior values of  will 
require cognitive mediation of the respective learning signals, we use  to 
approximate the level of such cognitive mediation between the dual-process of learning 
for each subject. Brain regions invoked in mediating the dual-process will correlate more 
strongly with the orthogonalized EWA prediction error signal for subjects employ such 
cognitive mediation when compared with subjects that do not. We conduct between 
subjects analysis to look for the regions in which neural betas for the orthogonalized 
EWA prediction errors correlates with . Mediating signals are found to 
significantly covary with the orthogonalized EWA prediction errors across subjects in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (Figure 15), 
revealing these regions possible importance in mediating the balance between 
reinforcement and belief-based learning. 
However, such a result is very limited, give that it is a between subject analysis. 
Future study will be done to test the explore this part more formally including PPI on a 
trial by trial basis within each subject. 
 
Expected Reward Regions 
As shown in Figure 16, we found activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
extending to rACC and medial orbitofrontal cortex, to be correlated with the relative  
 
  
! 
"
!(1!!)
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Figure 14: Region significantly correlated with RL prediction errors after 
orthogonalizing it against EWA prediction error and BB relative 
prediction errors (yellow) overlays with activation region for EWA 
prediction errors (red) (p < 0.001, uncorrected, cluster size k > 10 
voxels).  (B) Region significantly correlated with BB relative prediction 
errors after orthogonalizing it against EWA and RL prediction errors 
(yellow) overlays with activation region for EWA prediction errors (red) 
(p < 0.001, uncorrected, cluster size k > 10 voxels). Notably, activation in 
the putamen is no longer correlated with the BB relative prediction 
errors, controlling for EWA and RL. The only activation region for the 
double orthogonalized BB relative prediction errors is rACC. 
 
 
Figure 15: The degree to which a subject mediates reinforcement and 
belief-based prediction error signals is measured by the estimated value 
of !(1!!) . Activities in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL) correlates better with the orthogonalized 
EWA among subjects with more intensive cognitive mediation between 
the two separate learning  processes (p < 0.001 uncorrected, cluster size  
> 10) 
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expected reward value of the chosen action.  The relative expected reward is defined as 
the probability generated from the EWA model for the chosen action on a given trial. We 
used this notion in order to remove the possible time trend in the absolute expected 
reward values.  This result is consistent with existing evidence on the role of orbital and 
adjacent medial prefrontal cortex in encoding predictions of future reward (Daw, 2006; 
O'Doherty, 2004). It further supports the hypothesis that strategic learning can be 
characterized as a TD process. 
 
Other Forms of BB Prediction Errors 
In principle, BB model does not rule out the possibility that the brain encodes 
prediction error signals beyond those of chosen strategies at the feedback event. This is 
particularly interesting because in BB learning the expected values of unchosen actions 
do not decay at a rate constant across all unchosen actions as in the standard RL, but 
rather vary in a relatively complicated way depending on the change of player’s belief 
about opponents’ future strategy as well as the payoff of each action profile. Figure 17 
shows the activation regions correspond to different notions of relative prediction errors 
for BB learning beyond those of chosen actions. This evidence, however, is limited 
because our design was not optimized to find prediction errors other than those associated 
with the chosen actions. 
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Figure 16: Activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, extending to rACC 
and medial orbitofrontal cortex, is correlated with respect to relative 
expected reward value of the chosen action calculated under the EWA 
model (p < 0.005 uncorrected, cluster size  > 10).  
 
 
Figure 17: (A) F-test for regions significantly correlated with BB relative 
prediction errors of unchosen actions for weak players (p < 0.005 
uncorrected, cluster size  > 10). (B) Regions significantly correlated with 
BB prediction error of the best ex-post action for weak players (p < 0.001 
uncorrected, cluster size  > 10) 
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Mentalization 
Beyond rACC, we found no evidence of involvement of those regions commonly  
implicated in mentalization, such as temporoparietal junction (TPJ) (Young, Cushman et 
al. 2007) and superior temporal sulcus (STS)(Amodio and Frith 2006). This is consistent 
with the view that there exist different processes that meet different computational 
demands underlying mentalization (Jenkins and Mitchell 2010). That is, rACC activity in 
our population game may reflect first-order belief formation that is critical for belief-
based learning, whereas regions such as TPJ and STS may only come online in higher-
order mentalization and belief inference. This is consistent with findings from a fixed-
pair matching-penny game that taps higher-order belief inference (Hampton, Bossaerts et 
al. 2008), although another study that uses a spatial game did not find such regions 
(Yoshida, Dziobek et al. 2010). 
 
2.6 Discussion 
In order to test for the strategic learning process among a set of candidate models, 
the conventional method is to compare the in-sample explanatory power of different 
competing models that provide the best account of behavior. This runs into problems 
when two or more competing models provide qualitatively similar predictions about 
behavior. Using simulations, Salmon (2001) found this to be a potentially serious 
problem in traditional experimental studies on strategic learning. Here by taking the 
advantage of recent breakthroughs in understanding of the neural underpinnings of 
decision-making, we provide a new dimension of data and a biologically plausible 
criterion for understanding the strategic learning process.  By disentangling the unique 
 47 
contributions of various candidate learning models at neural level, we aim to (1) 
distinguish the underlying strategic learning process more accurately and to (2) provide 
insights on improving the existing models on strategic learning. 
In the present study, we explored the neural mechanisms underlying strategic 
learning by investigating the following two questions: (1) does there exist neural 
mechanisms that encode learning signals in the manner predicted by economic models of 
strategic learning?  (2) If so, does there exist a single unified neural system that drives 
strategic learning, or is behavior driven by inputs from possibly separable systems?  
Unlike previous studies of strategic learning, we designed our study to minimize 
collinearity in the outputs associated with the different models under consideration. We 
found that human participants learn though separate reinforcement and belief-based 
processes. These distinct signals were represented in both overlapping and distinct brain 
regions. Our study is therefore the first that provides evidence for model-based belief 
learning in a competitive game. Furthermore, by using non-nested model hypothesis 
testing, we was able to reject the hypothesis that learning behavior is driven by a unified 
model such as EWA. 
More specifically, we found that several learning signals—reinforcement, 
Cournot, and belief-based prediction errors—all appear to be represented in the putamen. 
The putamen is a region known to be involved in decision-making and learning (Yamada, 
Matsumoto et al. 2004; Daw, O'Doherty et al. 2006).  A number of previous 
neuroimaging studies on non-strategic reward learning found that activity in the putamen 
to be correlated with reward prediction error (McClure, Berns et al. 2003; O'Doherty, 
Dayan et al. 2003; O'Doherty, Buchanan et al. 2006; Rangel, Camerer et al. 2008).  More 
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recently, Lohrenz et al. (2007) studied the neural correlates of foregone payoff and found 
large activations to foregone payoffs in both ventral caudate and ventral putamen in a 
stock market investment task, suggesting that striatal regions including caudate and 
putamen are sensitive to foregone outcomes generally.   
Second, we found regions that dissociate between reinforcement and belief-based 
learning. In particular, we found that belief-learning signals were encoded in the anterior 
cingulate (ACC) and the medial prefrontal cortices (mPFC).  This finding differs with the 
previous studies on learning with no strategic or social motivations, where activations in 
ACC and mPFC are typically absent.  In contrast to striatal activity, the ACC, particular 
the rostral portions found in our study, and mPFC are more commonly associated with 
higher order executive functions such as control (Hampton, Bossaerts et al. 2008; Lee 
2008; Coricelli and Nagel 2009) and mentalizing (Hampton et al., 2008; Coricelli et al., 
2009), respectively. Given extensive reciprocal anatomical connections between the 
striatal (which includes putamen) and more prefrontal regions, it is difficult to 
hypothesize the degree to which either or both regions are necessary for representation of 
foregone payoffs/beliefs.  Disentangling this therefore requires techniques capable of 
assessing causality, such as the lesion method.    
Importantly, we reject the hypothesis of a hybrid EWA process at the neural level, 
even though it outperforms reinforcement and belief-based learning models behaviorally. 
This supports the hypothesis that behavior emerges as a result of multiple and possible 
competing learning signals.  These signals are in turn encoded in several unique and 
overlapping regions. This raises the interesting question whether there exists a third 
system that mediates the different learning signal inputs. This has implications given the 
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long-running debate on whether economic behavior is a result of the output of a unitary 
system or that of a competitive process between different brain systems (McClure, 
Laibson et al. 2004; Kable and Glimcher 2007; McClure, Ericson et al. 2007). Although 
our task was not optimized for this purpose, we provide some preliminary evidence that 
suggest the involvement of the DLPFC and IPL in such a mediating process. Specifically, 
individuals that exhibited both reinforcement and belief-based learning behaviorally 
showed greater activation in the DLPFC and IPL than those who exhibited primarily 
reinforcement or belief-based learning. This is consistent with previous studies that 
implicate DLPFC and IPL in cognitive regulation (MacDonald, Cohen et al. 2000; Badre 
and Wagner 2004).   
Our results have important implications for both economics and neuroscience. For 
neuroscience, we provide a potentially useful paradigm to study social and learning 
deficits in a variety of mental and neurological illnesses. For economics, we show how a 
combination of traditional laboratory experiments and newly available methods from 
neuroscience can provide novel data about latent decision-making processes. This will 
potentially allow us to improve predictive power of econometric models of learning 
dynamics in real-world situations. 
 
 50 
CHAPTER 3 
NEURAL CAUSALITY FOR STRATEGIC LEARNING:  
A LESION STUDY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The neuroimaging method we used in the previous chapter is limited by its 
observational and correlative nature. It only provides inferences about the association of 
the brain regions with the learning signals, and hence it is unable to conclusively 
demonstrate whether the identified neural system is necessary for strategic learning. In 
particular, our fMRI study shows that both putamen and anterior cingulate cortex are 
involved in belief-based learning. Given the extensive reciprocal anatomical connections 
between these regions, however, it is difficult to tell the degree to which either or both 
regions are necessary for representation of belief learning signals based on the 
neuroimaging result. More importantly, the fMRI study showed that strategic learning 
involves dissociable learning signals, which independently activate both distinct and 
overlapped brain areas known to process reward learning signals and social belief 
inferences. Yet it does not prove the brain areas activate by different learning signals are 
necessary for the putatively isolated learning processes. There remains a critical gap in 
the evidence relating strategic learning, reward learning and the brain. 
Here we adopt the lesion method to disentangle the causality of different brain 
regions for strategic learning by examining whether the orbitofrontal cortex, basal 
ganglia, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex are necessary for strategic learning.  In 
particular, we compared the behavior of patients with lesion to orbitofrontal cortex (OFC, 
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n = 7), basal ganglia (BG, n = 6), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, n = 9) 
across strategic learning treatment and a control treatment of reward learning.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
Figure 18: Hypothesis for strategic and reward learning. Both involve 
reinforcement and belief based learning, with different weights.  
 
Based on both the literature we reviewed and our preliminary neuroimaging 
analyses, We hypothesized that both strategic and reward learning can be decomposed to 
reinforcement and belief-based (fictitious play) learning, with higher weight on belief-
based learning relative to reinforcement learning in the strategic treatment than in reward 
learning treatment (Figure 18). We further hypothesized that there exist double 
dissociation between different brain regions and different types of learning. In particular, 
basal ganglia (which includes putamen) are necessary for reinforcement learning and the 
OFC necessary for belief-based learning.  Furthermore, the DLPFC are necessary for 
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mediating reinforcement and belief-based learning processes in both strategic and reward 
treatments. Based on these hypotheses, we predicted that patients with basal ganglia 
lesions will be impaired in reward learning treatment, patients with the OFC lesions will 
show deficits in strategic learning treatment, and patients with the DLPFC lesions will be 
impaired in both reward and strategic learning.   
 
3.2. Background  
Lesion Study 
Lesion studies seek to draw necessity inferences by demonstrating the inactivation 
of particular brain regions disrupt a certain cognitive process. It has been proven to be a 
powerful method especially when combined with functional neuroimaging.  
 The first group of lesion patients we consider is the orbitofrontal cortex and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) patients.  The region projects to basal forebrain 
and brainstem area, and neurons within the OFC and VMPC have been shown to encode 
the emotional, social value of sensory stimuli (Stone, Baron-Cohen et al. 1998; Tekin and 
Cummings 2002; Rudebeck and Murray 2008).  Patients with damage to orbitofrontal 
cortex and with ventromedial damage, typically have severe deficits in social and 
decision-making functioning. For example, in the famous case of Phineas Gage, he 
survived the accident of an iron rod blast that damaged the bilateral OFC area of his 
brain. Surprisingly, his intelligence, memory and other cognitive abilities were intact, but 
social and decision-making abilities were found to be impaired (Ongür and Price 2000).  
Over the past decade this interesting pattern of impairment has been confirmed from 
other OFC lesion patient studies and dysfunction of the OFC has been further 
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characterized by personality change including lack of interpersonal sensitivity and 
empathy, and responding inappropriately to social clues (Bechara, Tranel et al. 1997; 
Stone, Baron-Cohen et al. 1998; Camille, Coricelli et al. 2004; Maia and McClelland 
2004; Koenigs, Young et al. 2007; Wallis 2007; Chamberlain, Menzies et al. 2008; 
Krajbich, Adolphs et al. 2009).  
The second group of lesion patients we consider is basal ganglia (which includes 
putamen) patients. There have been robust evidences suggesting that basal ganglia are 
crucial in stimulus-response learning (Bellebaum, Koch et al. 2008; Yehene, Meiran et al. 
2008; Baier, Karnath et al. 2010; Maia and Frank 2011).  For example, according to the 
actor-critic model, which have used to account for many behavioral and neural findings 
in stimulus response learning for both human and nonhuman primates, the basal ganglia 
is critical for action selection by implementing two learning modules: (1) the critic, which 
learns state values, and (2) the actor, which learns stimulus-response associations 
(O'Doherty, Dayan et al. 2004). Some evidences further suggested that the basal ganglia 
likely select actions according to the probabilities learned from reward reinforcement 
among candidate actions that are initially generated by the cortex (Frank 2005; Frank, 
Woroch et al. 2005). However, there is not much well established experimental probe for 
decision making for patients with basal ganglia lesions, mostly due to the scarcity of the 
patients. Studies for patients with Parkinson’s disease, which exhibits reduced striatal 
dopamine resulting from dopaminergic cell death, mainly adopted experimental 
paradigms of reward learning such as probability learning tasks and showed behavioral 
abnormalities consistent with the neural model predictions (Frank, Seeberger et al. 2004; 
Frank, Samanta et al. 2007) .   
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The third group we considered is the patients with dorsolateral prefrontal lesions. 
In the previous chapter, we have some preliminary result suggesting that this is the region 
mediating the two learning processes.  It is widely acknowledged that the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex mainly involves in executive functions, including cognitive control, 
emotion regulation, and working memory (Tekin and Cummings 2002; Mansouri, 
Buckley et al. 2007;  MacDonald, Cohen et al. 2000; Miller 2000). Patients with DLPFC 
lesion have been robustly shown through clinical studies impaired performances in the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which requires regulating or shifting actions, and reversal 
learning (Milner 1963; MacDonald, Cohen et al. 2000; Nyhus and Barceló 2009). Recent 
neuroeconomic study (Hare, Camerer et al. 2009) also suggested that the DLPFC plays a 
critical role in the deployment of self-control in everyday decisions, such as choices over 
healthy and unhealthy snacks, through mediating multiple independent value signals. 
Furthermore, our previous imaging study has also suggested DLPFC as a candidate 
region for mediating RL and BB prediction error signals.  
 
Computational method for lesion study 
Traditionally, the lesion study was based on direct comparison of the behavior 
across different lesion groups (or patients and healthy controls).  Recently computational 
methods have adopted in lesion studies, which allows us to explore the differences at 
deeper level by reasoning from behavior to its mechanistic causes, and also provides a 
way to test the computational modeling itself (Maia and Frank 2011). For example, one 
of the approaches involves fitting the behavioral data of both control and lesion patient 
groups separately to a computational model, which made explicit assumptions on the 
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internal process underlying the cognitive task, and then comparing the best fitting 
parameters and correlations between these parameters and disease severity (Figure 19).  
 
 
Figure 19: The “quantitative abductive” approach for computational 
method of lesion study. Adapted from Maia and Frank (2011). 
 
3.3. Method 
Subjects 
We ran samples of 42 participants, including patients with orbitofrontal lesion (n 
= 7), basal ganglia lesion (n = 6), dorsolateral prefrontal lesion (n = 9), and healthy 
subjects (n = 10).  All lesion patients are recruited from Bon Knight’s Lab at University 
of California, Berkeley. The patients have stable, chronic lesions and are highly 
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functioning (Figure 20, individual lesion area are included in 3.6). Control subjects were 
recruited from craigslist and Berkeley recruiting center.  They were matched to patients 
by age and education and screened according to health and neurological condition, usage 
of prescription drug and other medication.  All subjects’ demographical information as 
well as their memory performance, IQs and performance in Wisconsin Card Sort Test is 
listed in Table 4.  
 
Procedure 
All participants attended one strategic learning treatment and a reward learning 
treatments, with the order of treatments and roles in the game counter balanced. In the 
strategic learning treatment, participants played the Patent Race game, which was exactly 
the same as described in the previous chapter. All participants were randomly and 
anonymously matched with the pooled opponents (same pooled opponents as in the 
previous chapter) throughout the 80 rounds.  
In the reward learning treatment, the participants were instructed that they were 
playing an 80 round card game against the computer. The rule and payoff structural is the 
same as in the strategic learning treatment. In each round the computer draws a card 
randomly from a deck containing either from Joker (equal to 0) to four or from Joker to 
five depending on the role of the player (Figure 21). Without knowing which card the 
computer has drawn, the player will pick a card from his own deck and he will win if his 
card is larger than the computer’s card. Moreover, in each round the computer draws the 
card following the same probability as the empirical frequency of opponent’s choices in  
 57 
 
Table 4: demographical information of the subjects. Means (standard 
errors) of age, years of education, verbal memory score in bower 
memory test ( out of 20) and perseverative errors in Wisconsin Card 
Sorting test ( out of 48). 
 
Figure 20: Patient MRIs. Structural MRI slices illustrating the lesion 
overlap across patient groups.  Software reconstructions were performed 
using MRIcro (Rorden and Brett 2000). 
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the same round of the strategic treatment.  Different interface was adopted only to avoid 
possible confusion between two treatments especially for those with possible memory 
impairments.  
All participants received detailed instructions and practices, and were required to 
pass a quiz prior to the experiment to ensure sufficient understanding of rule of the game 
and the ability to predict payoffs given an arbitrary choice profile.  Different from our 
previous fMRI study however, all participants were paid at a flat rate due to human 
subjects restrictions to lesion patients. 
 
3.4. Results  
 Summary of aggregate empirical frequencies of choices are presented in Figure 
5. A better way for visualization the choices is through the transition matrices (Figure 
22), which show the joint empirical frequencies of choices at trial t+1 conditional on 
choices at trial t for each cohort in each role, computed by pooling the observations 
across trials and subjects within lesion group given under the particular treatment. These 
matrices show how players switch their choices from one trial to the next, and are 
generalizations of more traditional switch/stay measures. In particular, the diagonal 
elements indicate choices in which subjects stayed, whereas off-diagonals indicate 
switches.  
 
Healthy Controls  
It is clear through introspection that the behavior of the healthy comparison group 
in Figure 22 is quite similar between strategic and reward learning, except that more  
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Table 5: Pooled empirical frequencies of choices for each lesion group 
under each treatment. Up: strong role. Bottom: weak role.   
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Figure 22: Transition matrices across lesion groups and treatments. On 
the X-axis of the matrix it is the empirical frequencies of the cohort’s 
choice at trial t, and on the Y-axis, it is the empirical frequencies of the 
choice at trial t+1. A: Strong players. B: Weak Players.   
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weights are distributed on the diagonal of the transition matrices under reward learning 
treatments for both strong and weak roles. For example, strong players in the strategic 
learning treatment switched from investing 5 to 1 approximately 8% of all trials. In 
approximately 20% of all trials, Strong players stayed with investing 5. In contrast, the 
reward learning switching rate is much lower, consistent with the observation that reward 
learning, subserved primarily by reinforcement learning, is a slower process. This is 
apparent in that most of the mass of the transition matrix is located along the diagonal 
(indicating stay trials) at investment of 1, 3, and 5.  
To understand why this is the case, we fit the EWA model with the experimental 
data from control subjects in reward and strategic learning respectively and conducted 
grid search over a large space of parameters. The result is visualized in Figure 25. The 
details of EWA model are introduced in the previous chapter. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the estimation result shows that control subjects do present both 
reinforcement and belief-based learning in both strategic and reward treatments, yet with 
higher relative weight on belief-based learning under the strategic treatment (i.e. higher 
value of !).  
To further verify that the distinction in the choice patterns across two treatments 
can be explained by different portions of reinforcement and belief-based learning, we 
simulated choices under pure belief based learning and pure reinforcement learning 
respectively and visualized those with transition matrices. As shown in Figure 23, 
strategic learning is qualitatively more similar to belief based learning and reward 
learning to reinforcement learning simulations. More specifically, almost all the weights 
are distributed on the diagonal in the transition matrix for simulated reinforcement 
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learning, similar to the distribution of reward learning matrix. Whereas in the transition 
matrix for belief based learning the weights (except (5,5)) are more off diagonal, similar 
to the distribution of strategic learning. 
 
Lesion Subjects 
For lesion subjects, let’s first take a look at the model-free measures of behavior, 
which can give us a better qualitative picture of the data if the underlying model 
assumptions are violated, and a sense of the qualitative deficits of the particular lesion 
groups. As shown in Figure 22, the primary difference between strategic and 
 
Figure 23: Comparison across behavioral and simulated data for control 
subjects playing strong roles. Top Left: Empirical frequency of 
transitions for behavioral data in strategic treatment. Top Right: transition 
matrix for simulated choices based on pure belief-based learning. Bottom 
Left: transition matrix for behavioral data in reward treatment. Bottom 
Right: transition matrix for simulated choices based on pure 
reinforcement learning.Model-free measure using transition matrices for 
Strong player.  
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reward learning in healthy controls is the switching behavior across rounds. Choices of 
the lesion groups however differ substantially across treatments, and support the 
hypothesis of distinct reinforcement and belief pathways. First, BG patients appear 
particularly impaired in reward learning, rarely choosing to invest 5 in the Strong role, 
instead often choosing 2 and 3. This can be compared to strategic learning, where they 
chose to invest 4 and 5 quite often. The OFC patients in contrast appear to show the 
reverse effort, performing seemingly randomly in strategic learning but quite well in 
reward learning. This raises the interesting possibility that the BG patients are able to use 
the belief based learning to substitute for the impairments in reward learning deficits. 
 
Iteratively elimination of dominated strategies in strategic treatment 
In order to further investigate the reasons for the distinct behavior patterns across 
lesion groups, it will be helpful to understand the game theoretic prediction about how a 
“perfectly rational” player would reason under the strategic treatment. The standard game 
theory arrives at a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution for the Patent Race game 
based on the assumption that both strong and weak players have perfect “theory of 
mind”, so that they can introspectively imagine that they are in the shoes of the other 
player, and reason their way to Nash equilibrium in the following way: Consider first the 
choice of the strong player. The Strong player is guaranteed 10 by investing her entire 
endowment of 5. This is more than she can win by investing 0, which guarantees an 
earning of 5, the initial endowment. The Strong player, therefore, should never invest 0. 
Turning now to the Weak player, he now “knows” Strong will invest an amount strictly 
greater than 0. This leads Weak to never invest 1, as he will lose for sure (recall that both 
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players lose in ties) and earning 4 by 2 investing nothing is better than investing 1 and 
earning 3. Turning back to the Strong player, who knows Weak will not invest 1, will 
then never invest 2. This is because an investment of 2 is only optimal when the other 
party invests 1. This process continues until the Strong player removes all even strategies 
from consideration, Weak player all odd strategies, and both players randomize over the 
remaining strategies such that no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate.  Such a 
process of reasoning is called iteratively elimination of (strongly) dominated strategies, 
which is one of the most basic solution concepts in games theory, and have been widely 
applied to experimental studies, such as Beauty Contest (Nagel 1995; Duffy and Nagel 
1997), Centipede game (McKelvey and Palfrey 1992), and etc. 
In reality, the first time players are exposed to a strategic game such as Patent 
Race or Beauty Contest Game, they are in general unable to conduct the full depth of 
iterative reasoning. Yet extensive experimental studies have shown that subjects are able 
to improve such reasoning when playing the game repeatedly. The question is that if 
lesion subjects are also able to improve strategic reasoning during learning.  
The top panel in Figure 24 suggests different abilities of lesion participants to 
learn to eliminate iteratively dominated strategies in strategic learning, by comparing the 
empirical cumulative distributions for the portion of subjects playing the corresponding 
iteratively dominated strategies. For example, the first row of the strategic panel in Figure 
8 suggests that almost all control subjects, OFC lesion patients and BG lesion patients 
deleted investing 0 as strong player, yet around 15% of DLPFC patients selected 0 as 
strong player throughout 80 rounds. Moreover, in the 2nd and 3rd row of the same panel, 
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Figure 24: Iteratively elimination of strongly dominated strategies. The 
empirical cumulative distributions of the portion of lesion subjects 
playing the corresponding iteratively dominated strategies (red line), 
compared to the healthy controls( grey line). X-axis indicates the 
frequency of playing the corresponding strategies. Y-axis represents the 
portion of experimental cohort.  Up: strategic treatment. Down: reward 
learning treatment.  
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the healthy controls (grey line) significantly eliminated the usage of  1st and 2nd order of 
iteratively strongly dominated strategies. Within lesion patients, DLPFC patients showed 
no sign of reduction of the usage of such strategies, and BG patients surprisingly 
significantly deleted those strategies over the 80 rounds, whereas OFC patients only 
significantly eliminated 1st order of iteratively dominated strategy but not the second 
order one. 
Interestingly in the control treatment of reward learning,  there exits no significant 
elimination of iteratively dominated strategies for both healthy controls and lesion 
subjects, as presented in the bottom panel of Figure 24.  
To summarize, these results imply that (1) BG patients appeared to learn to 
eliminate iteratively dominated strategies in strategic learning. (2) OFC patients seemed 
to be bale to eliminate the lower order of iteratively dominated strategy but not the higher 
order one, which is in line with the existing studies suggesting that patients with lesion to 
OFC region perform well in simple theory of mind test but show deficits inn more 
advanced one. (3) DLPFC patients seemed to be impaired for such strategic reasoning at 
all levels.  
 
Model-Based Estimation 
This qualitative pattern is supported by our model-based measures (Figure 25). 
The standard errors of the EWA estimators are estimated with a jackknife approach. 
More specifically, for a lesion group of sample size n, n runs of EWA estimations were 
computed. In each run, one subject was excluded from the corresponding lesion group 
and the EWA model was estimated using the remaining (n-1) subjects.  The standard 
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errors of the EWA estimators are then the standard deviations of jackknife estimates 
across the N runs. To evaluate how well the model fits the data, we also computed pseudo 
R2, which shows how much EWA model outperforms the model of random choice. 
Pseudo R2 is defined as the difference between the AIC of EWA and the log likelihood of 
a random model, scaled by the random-model log likelihood. Hence when the value is 
equal to 1, it means that the model predicts all choices with probability 1. If its value is 
equal to 0, it means that the model’s explanatory power is the same as a pure random 
choice model.  
 
Figure 25: EWA estimation results for different lesion groups. X-axis is 
pseudo R2 and thus shows how well our model captures the data relative 
to a model where players choose randomly.  The Y-axis is the estimated 
value of !, which measures how much subjects’ choices are driven by 
belief learning relative to reinforcement learning. The x-axis A quantity 
of 0 thus implies the model fits no better than a random model. Error bars 
are standard errors for !, computed with Jackknife method. 
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Figure 25 visualized the main estimation result. On the x-axis, it is the value of 
pseudo R2 for the lesion group under the particular treatment. On the y-axis, it is the 
estimated value of !, which captures the weight on the belief based learning relative to 
reinforcement learning. Figure 9 shows that:  (1) choices of DLPFC patients cannot be 
captured by EWA model well, as indicated by the values of pseudo R2; (2) Choices of 
BG reward and OFC strategic are also not well captured by EWA model, i.e. the 
explanatory power of the EWA is not much higher than a random model; (3) in contrast, 
data from BG strategic and OFC reward session fit better. (4) Estimated value for ! is 
higher in the BG strategic cohort than in the OFC reward cohort.  
Taken together, these results suggest that (1) the DLPFC patients appear 
completely impaired in both social and reward learning treatments; (2) it appears to be a 
double dissociation between the two treatments, strategic and reward leaning, and the 
brain regions, the BG and OFC.  This raises the interesting possibility that the BG 
patients are able to use the belief learning regions to substitute for the impairments in 
reward learning deficits. 
 
Model-based estimation and interactively elimination of dominated strategies 
To further verify that when our computational model has explanatory power, it 
was able to quantify the pattern of data apparent in the model-free measurements, we 
linked the model-based estimation with the iteratively elimination of dominated strategies 
through simulation. Figure 26 presents the simulated results for reward and strategic 
learning, which is consistent with our previous findings.  
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Figure 26: Simulated probability of selecting the interactively dominated 
strategies under reinforcement and belief-based learning respectively. Up: 
simulated belie-based learning. Bottom: simulated reinforcement 
learning.  
 
3.5. Discussions 
In this chapter study we aimed at investigating the causal relationships between  
brain regions to strategic learning. Specifically, we tested whether those regions are 
necessary for strategic learning, by comparing the behavior of patients with lesion to 
orbitofrontal cortex (n = 7), basal ganglia (n = 6), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (n = 
9) across strategic learning and a control treatment of non-strategic learning. Our 
preliminary result suggests that OFC patients performed well in non-strategic tasks yet 
showed deficits in strategic treatment, whereas BG patients were impaired in non-
strategic learning. Somewhat surprisingly, BG patients performed better in strategic 
treatment compared to non-strategic treatment, which raises the interesting possibility 
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that the BG patients are able to use the theory of mind regions to substitute for the 
impairments in reward learning deficits. Finally we found that DLPFC patients appear 
completely impaired in both strategic and reward learning treatments. This of course can 
be due to a number of possibilities. We will accordingly include additional reward and 
strategic learning tasks used in the previous literature to test the specificity of the effects 
across tasks in this cohort, e.g. Iowa Gambling Task, Wisconsin Card Sort, and the multi-
round Trust Game.  
Overall, the BG and OFC results provide preliminary support for our hypothesis 
that these regions are respectively necessary for reinforcement and belief-based learning 
that subserved both reward and strategic learning. On the other hand, the poor fit of the 
model in some of the treatments calls for a revision of our model in order to provide a 
model-based measure of the impaired behavior and functions and not merely of the 
preserved behavior and functioning. Finally, we will in our future work to study the 
learning behavior at individual level and associate the symptom severity with both 
individualized model free and model-based measurements.  
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3.6. Patient MRIs and individual transition matrices 
 
Figure 27:  UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 11. Down: Lesion area for subject 11.  
 
Figure 28: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 12. Down: Lesion area for subject 12.  
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Figure 29: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 17. Down: Lesion area for subject 17.  
 
Figure 30: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 20. Down: Lesion area for subject 20.  
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Figure 31: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 19. Down: Lesion area for subject 19.  
 
Figure 32: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 21. Down: Lesion area for subject 21.  
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Figure 33: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 20. Down: Lesion area for subject 20.  
 
Figure 34: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 14. Down: Lesion area for subject 14.  
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Figure 35: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 31. Down: Lesion area for subject 31.  
 
Figure 36: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 27. Down: Lesion area for subject 27.  
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Figure 37: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 15. Down: Lesion area for subject 15.  
 
Figure 38: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 25. Down: Lesion area for subject 25.  
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Figure 39: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 24. Down: Lesion area for subject 24.  
 
 
Figure 40: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 16. Down: Lesion area for subject 16.  
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Figure 41: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 18. Down: Lesion area for subject 18.  
 
Figure 42: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 22. Down: Lesion area for subject 22.  
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Figure 43: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 28. Down: Lesion area for subject 28.  
 
Figure 44: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 32. Down: Lesion area for subject 32.  
 
 81 
 
Figure 45: UP: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward 
treatment for subject 26. Down: Lesion area for subject 26.  
 
Figure 46: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward treatment for 
subject 29. Subject 29 is known to have lesion in Basal Ganglia. MRI is 
unavailable. 
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Figure 47: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward treatment for 
subject 30. Subject 30 is known to have lesion in right DLPFC. MRI is 
unavailable. 
 
 
Figure 48: Transition matrices for both strategic and reward treatment for 
subject 23. Subject 23 is known to have lesion in left DLPFC. MRI is 
unavailable. 
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3.7. Reaction time for each lesion groups across treatments. 
Reaction time is defined as the time from the game presentation onset to the end 
of the decision-making, which is widely used in lesion studies for both human and non-
human primates (Frank, Seeberger et al. 2004; Frank, Samanta et al. 2007; Buckley, 
Mansouri et al. 2009). Although we think it is only indirect information associated with 
strategic learning, we still included the median reaction time for each lesion group under 
each treatment in Figure 49. Note that according to Figure 49, the BG patients have the 
most distinct pattern of reaction time, i.e. they are slower in reward learning than in the 
strategic learning, which may be interpreted as a supporting evidence for our model-
based estimation result that BG patients are less impaired in strategic learning.  
 
Figure 49: Reaction time for each lesion group under each treatment. The 
median action times for each lesion group and are smoothed over a time 
window of 15 periods.  
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CHAPTER 4 
AGING AND STRATEGIC LEARNING 
 
4.1. Introduction 
It has been widely recognized that the portion of the elderly adults in the global 
population will keep growing, due to the increase in average life expectancies as well as 
the decline in birth rates (United Nation and Economic Division 2001). As a result, the 
elderly’s economic decisions have gained higher relative social impacts.  To take just one 
measure, the median net worth of a 65-year-old American in 2007 is more than double 
that of a 40-year-old (Bucks, Kennickell et al. 2009). Despite the growing demand for 
understanding how economic decision-making change over the lifespan, only a handful 
researches have focused on characterizing the relationship between economic decision 
and aging at behavioral level (Kovalchik, Camerer et al. 2005), and identifying how 
functional, anatomical, and neurochemical changes in the aging brain will affect the 
competence of economic decision making (Li, Biele et al. 2007; Samanez-Larkin, Gibbs 
et al. 2007; Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen et al. 2010).  
Some popular stereotypes suggest that the ability for making strategic decisions 
declines with aging, yet other commonly held beliefs emphasize the wisdom of age 
especially for tasks involved pragmatic reasoning (Grossmann, Na et al. 2010);  
(Staudinger, Cornelius et al. 1989; Nyberg, Sandblom et al. 2003). Real world empirical 
evidences have suggested that the elderly population is particularly vulnerable in a 
number of ways. For example, the elderly are disproportionate targets of fraud across the 
world (Templeton and Kirkman 2007). They are thought to constitute approximate 30% 
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of all fraud victims in the United States, but even this figure is likely to be too low due to 
likelihood of widespread underreporting (Bucks et al. 2009). It has been hypothesized 
that such vulnerability can be in part be attributed to a decline in the ability for strategic 
thinking in order to avoid being exploited by others.  Similarly, research has documented 
that the elderly investors continued to invest in stock markets even after losses large 
enough to postpone their retirement, suggesting a relatively flat learning curve when 
adapting to an uncertain environment (Rappaport and Dragut 2005).   
Yet it is challenging to identify the precise deficits underlying such vulnerability 
at the behavioral and neural levels.  Unlike memory and motor impairments, which are 
readily recognized as symptoms of more serious underlying neurological conditions, 
decision-making deficits often do not elicit comparable concern in the elderly (Denburg, 
Tranel et al. 2005). There are also few neuropsychological tools or biomarkers available 
to measure and quantify decision-making deficits, particularly those that contain a social 
component. 
In this paper I studied a specific type of economic decision for the elderly sample, 
the strategic learning in a repeated normal form game. More specifically, I examined the 
elderly’s decision making (1) in an environment where outcomes do not depend on his or 
her own choice alone but upon the choices of others; and (2) from a dynamic point of 
view when choices unfold over time. That is I studied how the elderly learns from the 
past rewards and punishments as well as the possible strategies used by other intellectual 
agents in order to avoid being exploited by others. Such decision-making is ubiquitous in 
social life. Examples include playing poker, investing in stock market, or trade 
negotiation. Understanding how the ability for strategic learning changes over the adult 
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lifespan will be have important social and economic implications, such as providing 
individual cognitive improvement as well as guide for social policy making, ranging from 
allocating personal wealth to selecting medical care.  
 
4.2. Literature Review 
Recent behavioral cognitive researches suggested variable degeneration across 
different cognitive abilities over adult lifespan (Figure 50; Hedden and Gabrieli 2004; 
Reuter-Lorenz and Lustig 2005; Dennis and Cabeza 2008; Grady 2008). For example, 
working memory and perceptual speed were found robustly decline with aging, while 
semantic knowledge and emotional processing remain stable (Schaie 1996; Walhovd, 
Fjell et al. 2005; Williams, Brown et al. 2006). Similarly, different patterns of economic 
behaviors have also been mapped across different age groups, such as changes in social 
preferences (Kovalchik, Camerer et al. 2005), risk attitude (Kovalchik, Camerer et al. 
2005; Samanez-Larkin, Kuhnen et al. 2010), and discounting rate (Green, Fry et al. 
1994). These findings suggest distinct age-related affect on neural substrates underlying 
different functions (Hedden and Gabrieli 2004). Here I review the literature related to 
age-associated change in strategic learning from two aspects:  strategic reasoning (theory 
of mind) and learning.  
 
Aging and Theory of Mind  
The ability of guessing what others will do without any prior contractual 
agreements and use this knowledge in social interaction is referred to “theory of mind” 
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(Happé, Winner et al. 1998; Amodio and Frith 2006) or strategic reasoning (Camerer, Ho 
et al. 2003), which has been extensively studied from both psychology and economics  
 
 
Figure 50: (A) cross-sectional and (B) longitudinal studies on the 
changes in a variety of cognitive functions across adult lifespan. Adapted 
from Schaie (1996) 
perspectives. In psychology, verbal and graphical stories and are often used to examine 
subjects’ ability of making inferences about the thoughts and feeling of the characters 
(Amodio and Frith 2006). For example, some (Charlton, Barrick et al. 2009; McKinnon 
and Moscovitch 2007; Slessor, Phillips et al. 2007) suggested a decline in the ability of 
theory of mind with normal aging.  Yet other studies (Happé, Winner et al. 1998);   
(Grossmann, Na et al. 2010) found that older adults actually performed better than 
younger adults, in the face of possible decline in many forms of cognitive processing.  
In economics, game theory paradigm is one of the most popular tools for 
assessing the ability of strategic reasoning. Traditionally, notions of equilibria have been 
developed based on the assumption that players have perfect theory of mind and can 
guess accurately what others would do. While the concept of equilibrium are useful as an 
idealized model, a large number of experimental studies have shown that actual subjects 
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do not always make equilibrium choices and exhibit significant amount of individual 
differences in the level of theory of mind. Recent studies have further suggested that  
 
Figure 51: Healthy elderly subjects (average age 82) manifested no 
significant difference from young subjects (average age 20) in the 
beauty-contest game. In the plot, the left column is the tens digits, 
whereas the middle and left columns are the digits selected by each 
cohort. For instance, values within 30 to 39 have been selected by the 
young cohort most frequently. Similarly the elderly subjects picked 
values from 20 to 29 most frequently. Overall, both young and elderly 
cohort clustered at level 2 and 3 of strategic reasoning, yet the elderly is 
slightly more likely to select numbers larger than 50 (p<0.07). Adapted 
from Kovalchik, Camerer et al. (2005) 
there may exist reliable behavioral measurement on abilities reasoning (Stahl 1996; 
Camerer, Ho et al. 2004; Heinemann, Nagel et al. 2009) and its biology basis (Coricelli 
and Nagel 2009; Haruno and Kawato 2009; Bhatt, Lohrenz et al. 2010) based on young 
population.     
Kovalchik et al. (Kovalchik, Camerer et al. 2005) compared the ability of 
strategic reasoning between the young and healthy elderly subjects in a “p-beauty 
contest” paradigm, which has been widely used in many behavioral studies over a variety 
of representative populations, including business executives and collage students (Nagel 
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1995; Duffy and Nagel 1997). In Kovalchik’s task, subjects were told to play with nine 
other individuals from their research cohort by selecting any integer from 0 to 100.  The 
winner is the individual who is closest to 2/3 of the average of all the numbers selected in 
his/her cohort. Under such a setting, naive players would select answers randomly, 
resulting in a uniformly distributed number with an average of 50. Conditional on the 
belief that others are random players, one will select 2/3 of 50. Similarly, if one believes 
that all others reason their way to select 2/3 of 50, his/her best response will be 
(2/3)*(2/3) of 50. Such iterative reasoning process could go on and on depending on 
subjects’ belief about what his/her group members will do. Kovalchik found (Figure 51) 
no significant difference between the healthy elderly and young subjects, with both 
clustering at the second and third level of strategic reasoning. 
 
Aging and Learning 
Social interactions are rarely one-short games. Much of the evidence from 
experimental economics has suggested significant dynamic changes in strategic reasoning 
during repeated games (e.g. (Huck, Normann et al. 1999). However, these behavioral 
studies are mostly based on samples from young college students.  
Recent studies from cognitive neuroscience have compared reward learning 
between younger and older adults at both behavioral and neural level, suggesting the 
elderly adults has a reduced ability in accurately predicting the expected reward 
(Marschner, Mell et al. 2005; Schott, Niehaus et al. 2007), or learning from positive 
outcome (Mell, Heekeren et al. 2005). 
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Another popular task for assessing subjects’ ability to identify favorable choices 
in the long run is the so-call “Iowa Gambling Task” (IGT). In IGT (Bechara, Tranel et al. 
1997; Maia and McClelland 2004) subjects choose between 4 decks of cards repeatedly. 
Deck A and B are composed of high returns and high losses, and Deck C and D with low 
returns and low losses. Overall Deck C and D have negative mean with higher variance 
whereas Deck A and B have positive mean with lower variance. Moreover, decks are 
manipulated in such a way that subjects usually start with favoring the “bad decks”, Deck 
A and B, which yield high payoffs in the first a few rounds,  
 
 
Figure 52: A subset of the neurologically and psychiatrically healthy 
elder group of subjects demonstrated flatter learning curve during the 
Iowa Gambling Task, in spite of otherwise intact cognitive functioning.” 
Adapted from Denburg (2005, 2007) 
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and then switch to Deck C and D after they learn about the associated average payoff and 
variances from repeated sampling. 
A series of studies from the University of Iowa reported that at least a subset of 
the elderly subjects were locked in with the “bad” decks, indicating an impaired ability to 
identify favorable options in the long run (Denburg, Tranel et al. 2005; Denburg, Cole et 
al. 2007). Yet Kovalchik, Camerer et al. (2005) conducted a slightly different version of 
IGT (with only two decks) and found no significant difference between the young and 
elderly populations. 
From a formal perspective, IGT is somewhat similar to the well-studied multiple-
armed bandit problem in decision theory and dynamic control, but with poorly defined 
information set. Subjects have no information about the range or stationary of the 
underlying probabilities for each deck. Moreover, the draws are manipulated and are 
done without replacement. Consequently, a subject who failed to move to the “good” 
deck could totally because of ambiguity-aversion rather than impaired ability of learning.  
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
My hypotheses about age-associated change in strategic learning are based on (1) 
my previous studies on the neural computation underlying strategic learning, and (2) 
well-established neural evidences on aging brain.  My previous research suggests that 
strategic learning straddles both reward and belief based learning at both behavioral and 
neural level, with striatal area involved in both reward reinforcement and belief based 
learning, and medial prefrontal region associated only with belief-based learning.   
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Figure 53: Age-associated loss of dopamine transporter density in the 
striatum (caudate and putamen) from PET studies. Adapted from 
Samanez-Larkin, Gibbs et al. (2007). 
 
 
Figure 54: Significant tissue loss in gray matter volume in the insula), 
orbital frontal cortex, and cingulate cortex, from longitudinal studies 
through MRI. Adapted from Resnick, Pham et al. (2003)  
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On the other hand, there exist much evidences suggesting degeneration in these 
brain regions with normal aging. Firstly, dopaminergic system degenerates with normal 
aging, as shown in Figure 53. There are several lines of evidence supporting the idea that 
aging can have deleterious effects on decision-making abilities (Marschner, Mell et al. 
2005). Among the most persuasive evidence is the crucial role the nigrostriatal 
dopamininergic (DA) system plays in decision-making and its degeneration during aging. 
There exists much evidence that an intact dopaminergic system is necessary for reward 
processing (Knutson, Momenan et al. 2001; Hsu, Bhatt et al. 2005), reward learning 
(Fiorillo, Tobler et al. 2003), and decisions under both certainty and uncertainty (Schultz, 
Dayan et al. 1997; Bechara 2000; and Schultz 2000). During aging, there is a decrease in 
the number of and the number of synapses in these neurons (Erixonlindroth, Farde et al. 
2005), possibly underlying abnormalities observed in healthy older adults (Samanez-
Larkin, Gibbs et al. 2007).  
Secondly, in addition to degeneration of the dopaminergic system, longitudinal 
studies found frontal lobes suffered the most drastic loss of volume as assessed through 
MRI (Figure 54, Resnick, Pham et al. 2003). Executive function, as it is commonly 
conceived, consists of two aspects: an evaluative aspect, related to forming, maintaining, 
and updating appropriate models of the environment (which may be carried out through 
various types of memory processes) and an action-oriented aspect, which is instead 
involved with the coordination of other cognitive functions, including perception, 
attention, and action. This coordination presumably takes place over time, and is reflected 
in future behavior, so that when performed appropriately it can lead to successful 
adaptation to changing task demands. 
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Combining the above neural evidences together with my previous studies, I 
hypothesize that at behavioral level: (1) Old adults will perform poorer in Patent Race 
Game compared to young adults in overall performance; (2) Old adults will learn poorer 
to reason strategically in Patent Race Game compared to young adults;  (3) this difference 
can be captured by key parameters in my computational model across cohorts.  
 
4.4. Method 
Subjects 
We compare results from 30 young subjects from University of Illinois at Urbana 
and Champaign, and 29 elderly subjects recruited from: 1) local flyers and bulletins in the 
Berkeley community, 2) online forums such as Craigslist, and 3) Berkeley Retirement 
Center (BRC). Because the BRC serves retired faculty, staff and their families from UC 
Berkeley and Lawrence Berkeley National Labs, we anticipate the old adult sample will 
be more highly educated and healthy than the general population.  
All elderly subjects are confirmed to be healthy and with no significant 
neurological issues.  
 
Procedure 
Eligible participants were given the Patent Race task, and received a cognitive test 
battery, including Shipley test for IQ, Bower test for working memory, Wisconsin Card 
sort test, and RAPN for fluid IQ. At this and all subsequent stages of the experiment 
subjects were fully informed of the purposes of the research and were free to withdraw 
without penalty.  
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A similar protocol was used in the . Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were 
given instructions and quiz to ensure the understanding of the experiment. Participants 
played two stages of 80 rounds each of strong and weak roles (counterbalanced). 
Opponents’ choices were be drawn from a pool of 16 young adults who participated in an 
earlier session at University of Illinois at Urbana and Champaign. We did no run all 
subjects simultaneously because we want all subjects to play against a common 
distribution of opponents. Previous sessions comparing “live” sessions and “non-live” 
sessions show that young adults do not differ significantly across treatments. 
 
4.5. Model-Free Measurements 
Summary Statistics 
I started with simple visualization and comparison of choice behavior across age 
groups. First I compared the empirical frequencies of choices for strong and weak roles 
across trials and subjects for each age group (Table 7). In order to provide a benchmark 
for such comparison, the probabilities of the choices predicted by the unique mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium are also included. As shown in Table 7, young subjects on 
average were reasonably close to the Nash equilibrium prediction with the exception of 
overinvesting 4 and underinvesting 3 as strong players, whereas the distribution of 
choices made by elderly strong subjects were further away from Nash equilibrium 
prediction, with more evenly distributed choice over investing 2, 3, 4 and 5. Yet as weak 
players, both elderly and young subjects overinvested 0 and underinvested 4. However, 
elderly subjects also overinvested 1, which is the iteratively dominated strategy for the 
weak role.  
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Age Group Young Elderly 
Age 23.3 
(4.6) 
64.1 
(5.4) 
Gender 
(% of female) 
54% 60% 
Years of Education 14.4 
(1.1) 
15.0 
(0.9) 
Table 6: Demographic information and performance measure across age 
groups. Means (SEM). 
 
   Empirical 
Distribution 
Role Investment Equilibrium 
Prediction 
Young Elderly 
Strong 0 0% 0.83% 0.67% 
1 20% 17.50% 11.92% 
2 0% 9.54% 15.67% 
3 20% 11.13% 28.65% 
4 0% 16.21% 22.02% 
5 40% 44.79% 21.06% 
Weak 0 20% 49.29% 39.32% 
1 0% 3.46% 12.61% 
2 20% 6.46% 7.39% 
3 0% 13.46% 11.14% 
4 40% 27.33% 29.55% 
Table 7: Comparison of Nash equilibrium prediction with the Empirical 
frequencies from young and elderly cohorts.  
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Second, in order to examine the “stickiness” of choices between successive trials, 
I computed the average frequencies of repeating the previous choice across all subjects 
within each cohort. Figure 55 shows the relative frequencies of “staying” average across 
strong and weak roles for the two age groups. Young subjects’ on average repeated 
his/her investment for about 44% of the time during entire experiments (42% as strong 
players and 46% as weak players), which is exactly the same probability of “staying” if a 
subject follows Nash equilibrium prediction perfectly throughout the experiment. 
Whereas the elderly subjects repeated his/her previous investment with significantly 
higher chance, around 60% of the time (55% as strong players and 66% as weak players).  
 
 
Figure 55: Comparison of probabilities of “staying” across different age 
groups. Red dash line is the probability of repeat the same investment is 
the subject follows Nash equilibrium prediction.  
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Because “stickiness” is a very limited description for the overall dynamics of the 
play, next I explored the first order sequential dependencies of the choices by comparing 
transition matrices of the investment choice by each role at the group level.  Figure 56 
presents the joint empirical frequencies of investment choices at trial t+1 conditional 
investment at trial t for strong and weak roles. In both cases the transition matrices are 
computed by pooling the observations across trials and subjects within each age group. 
Again, as benchmarks for comparison, the transition matrices of a perfect Nash 
equilibrium player are included. The upper row in Figure 56 contains transition matrices 
for strong players. The young cohort randomized between investing 1 and 5 with higher 
chance of selecting 5 as predicted by Nash equilibrium. Yet they were discrepant from 
Nash equilibrium by mixing over investing 4 and 5 instead of including 3 into the 
randomization. The elderly cohort, on the other hand, has higher weight on the diagonal 
of the transition matrix, indicating they tended to repeat their previous choices a lot more 
often than mixing between different choices. Similar pattern was also found for the weak 
role. The young subject group switched between investing 0 and 4 about 10% of the time 
each, as predicted by Nash equilibrium, yet they underinvested 2 overinvested 3. The 
elderly subjects, however, mainly repeated investing 0, 1, 3 and 4, with occasional 
switching between 3 and 4.  These results are consistent with the conjecture that the 
elderly subjects were on average further away from the mixed-strategy equilibrium 
solution that calls for perfect randomization of choices between successive trials. 
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Model-free measurement of strategic learning 
In order to investigate into the reasons for the above discrepancies between 
younger and elder subjects behavior and Nash equilibrium predictions, I examined the 
level of strategic reasoning (theory of mind) within each cohort when playing the Patent 
Race game. The logic of iteratively elimination of dominated strategies is explained in 
the previous chapter.  
Firstly, I compared the portions of subjects who have almost never played the 
iteratively dominated strategies throughout 80 rounds, which provides a necessary but not 
sufficient measure for the depth of strategic reasoning. Panels on the left column of 
Figure 57 present the empirical cumulative distributions for the portion of subjects 
playing the corresponding iteratively dominated strategies. For example, the left panel of 
Figure 57A suggests that almost all subjects in both young and elderly cohorts deleted 
investing 0 as strong player (86% in young cohort and 100% in old cohort), the strongly 
dominated strategy. Similarly, about half of the subjects in both age groups have never 
chosen to invest 1 as weak players (60% in young cohort and 56% in elderly cohort) as 
suggested by the left panel of Figure 57B. About 30% of subjects in both age groups have 
never played 0 and 2 as strong players (47% in young cohort and 38% in the elderly 
cohort) as shown in the left panel of Figure 57C. Finally, almost none of the subjects 
from both age groups have deleted both 1 and 3 as weak players.  
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Figure 57: Iteratively elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Left: 
Empirical cumulative distributions of the portion of subjects playing the 
corresponding iteratively dominated strategies. X-axis indicates the 
frequency of playing the corresponding strategies. Y-axis represents the 
portion of experimental cohort.  The starting point on the Y-axis hence 
represents the portion of the experimental cohort that has eliminated the 
corresponding strategy (strategies). Right: Time trend for playing the 
corresponding strategy (strategies) within the portion of subjects who 
failed to eliminate the strategy (strategies).  
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Taken together, these results indicate that (1) less and less subjects engaged in 
strategic reasoning as the depth of iterative dominance increased. (2) Consistent with the 
observations from many previous studies (Nagel, 1999), the level of reasoning for both 
age groups does not go beyond of level of 3; (3) no significant difference was found in 
the portion and depth of engaging in iterative reasoning between the young and elderly 
samples in our experiment, in line with the findings based on a one-shot “beauty contest” 
game for the elderly subjects (Figure 51, Kovalchik, 2005). 
The above measurement takes a static view in interpretation subjects’ choices, 
largely ignoring the underlying time trend and the possibility for subjects learning to 
engage in strategic reasoning. For example, it is possible that a subject does not initially 
realized investing 1 is an inferior option as a weak player, but gradually decreases the 
chance of selecting 1 as best responding to his/her observation that 0 has rarely been 
selected by the opponents as choices unfolded over time. In order to investigate the 
possible learning effect, I then evaluated the time trends in playing iteratively dominated 
strategies. In particular, I focused on the subset of subjects who failed to completely 
eliminate the iteratively (strongly) dominated strategies, divided 80 rounds of the game 
into 4 blocks each with 20 rounds, and then compared the frequencies of selecting those 
choices within each block for both young and elderly cohorts respectively. The results are 
shown in the right column of Figure 57. Interestingly, as indicated by Figure 57B, the 
elderly and young subjects who failed to eliminate investing 1 as weak player actually 
started with almost the same empirical frequency for selecting 1 during the first 20 
rounds. In particular, both age groups started with a frequency close to the chance of 
playing pure randomly as weak players (20%). However, throughout 4 blocks, young 
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subjects significantly decreased the frequency of selecting 1, whereas the frequency of 
elderly cohort remained at similar level. Similar observation holds for strategies that are 
second level iteratively dominated, as suggested in the right panel of Figure 57C. Finally, 
both young and elderly subjects manifested no significant change in the frequencies of 
selecting both 1 and 3 as strong players (Figure 57D), the third level of iteratively 
dominated strategies.  
Together these results suggested that although there exist no significant difference 
between young and elderly subjects’ strategic reasoning from a static point of view, the 
two cohorts differ significantly in learning to perform strategically. According to our 
model-free measurement, elderly cohort presented a relatively flat learning curve. This 
finding is in line with previous studies based on IGT (Figure 52, Dohmen et al., 2005). 
However, such a model free measurement completely ignores the influence of opponents’ 
choices, remains silent on the internal mechanism for how and why the elderly cohort has 
a flatter learning curve, and hence provides largely qualitative conclusions from the data. 
In order to quantify differences in the learning process, I introduced computational 
models aiming at capturing group differences parametrically in the next session. 
 
4.6. Model-based Measurements 
Computational Model 
I adopted the “experience-weighted attraction” (EWA) model first introduced by 
Camerer and Ho (1999) to quantitatively compute the mapping from the stimulus inputs 
to the behavioral observations. There are two main attractive features of this model. First, 
it embeds two of the most widely used approaches to studying strategic learning in 
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competitive games – reinforcement learning and belief-based learning. The former is 
based on traditional models of reward learning (Schultz, Dayan et al. 1997; S. Sutton and 
G. Barto 1998; McClure, Berns et al. 2003). Players under this model are assumed to 
have a naïve mental model, and thus do not take into account of other players’ behavior. 
Belief learning on the other hand, assumes more sophisticated players who use history of 
play to forecast other players’ choices, and respond optimally given those forecasts 
(Cheung and Friedman 1997; Camerer, Ho et al. 2003), allowing them to learn to reduce 
playing the iteratively dominated strategies as suggested by the game theory concepts. 
Second, it allows for a sophisticated way to account for the depreciation of the 
past by separating the discount of the past experience and the discount of the past 
subjective values. In this way, it is set up to capture subtle yet important distinguishes 
that may cause differences in learning rates. In particular, EWA assumes that two types 
of past experience are involved in strategic learning: the experience during the 
experiment (in-game experience) and the experience before participating the experiment 
(prior belief). Both two types of past experience are assumed to matter for all future 
choice decisions in different ways. In particular, EWA introduces separated decay rates 
that control the future strengths of influences by in-game experience and prior belief 
respectively. For example, for prior belief, EWA contains a free parameter (N(0)) for its 
initial strength, which decays over time at the rate of $, whereas in-game experience 
decays at a different rate of  ". Moreover, EWA allows for the nonlinear interactions 
among these parameters, providing a hybrid model that is superior to the linear 
combination of reinforcement and belief based learning.  
Fro details of the EWA model and the meaning of the parameters, see chapter 2. 
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Figure 58: Hypotheses in the parameter space for EWA model. Elderly 
cohort is hypothesized to differ from the young cohort in the direction of 
one or more red arrows. Moreover, k is defined as 
! =1! ("
#
)
. Adapted 
from Camerer and Ho (1999). 
 
Hypotheses 
Based on observations from model-free measurements, I hypothesized that the 
difference in strategic learning can be captured by key parameters in my computational 
model across cohorts. In particular, one or more of the following may hold:  (1) Old 
adults will employ less belief based learning strategies, and more reinforcement 
strategies. That is smaller ! for elderly cohort; (2) Old adults on average adapts slower 
because they discount their in-game experiences more rapidly, indicating they are 
insensitive to (easier to forget) the recent in-game experiences. That is a smaller " for the 
elderly cohort; or (3) Elderly subjects are more “stubborn” in the sense that their pre-
 106 
game prior belief decays slower. That is the estimated value of 
! =1! ("
#
)
 for elderly 
cohort is closer to 0.  Figure 59 visualizes the above three hypotheses.   
 
Results 
First I estimated group level parameters for both young and elderly cohorts based 
on EWA model. More specifically, I assumed that there exists a representative model 
with a single, shared set of parameters that can explain choices across all subjects’ within 
the same age group possessing the same level of endowment. I thus pooled the 
observations conditional on age groups and roles, and fitted the choice data by 
maximizing the log likelihood of the observed choices over rounds for subject 
! 
i . That is, 
log pisi (t ) (t)( )t!i! . To estimate the model, I conducted a grid search over a large range of 
values for all free parameters, since the likelihood function is not globally concave. 
Standard errors were estimated through standard jackknife procedure (Camerer and Ho 
1999). Estimation results are summarized in Table 8 and visualized in  Figure 59. 
As hypothesized, elderly cohort has a relatively lower ! value, indicating that they 
are at group level they employ less belief based best responding strategy, and more 
simplistic reinforcement strategies. This is in line with the findings through fMRI that 
there may exist significant tissue loss in gray matter volume in mPFC (Figure 54), which 
is indicated involved in belief-based learning in my previous study. 
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 Group Level EWA Estimates 
Role Group ! $ N0 " # 
Strong Young .45 .90 
 
1.48 
  
.93 
  
.46 
  
Elderly .15 
  
.62 
  
2.54 
  
.88 
  
.23 
  
Weak Young 0.10 
  
.95 
  
8.24 
  
.97 
  
.58 
  
Elderly 0.00 
  
.51 
  
2.01 
  
.89 
  
.14 
  
Table 8: EWA estimation results at cohort level. Parentheses contain 
standard error for the estimates obtained through standard jackknife 
procedure.   
 
 
 
 Figure 59: (A) Jackknife estimators for young and elderly cohorts 
playing as strong players respectively. (B) Jackknife estimators for young 
and elderly cohorts playing as weak players respectively.  
  
 108 
In order to verify that the estimated different level of bias toward belief-based 
learning are indeed consistent with the model free measurements, we simply plot the 
estimated value of ! against empirical frequencies of playing the iteratively dominated 
strategies at individual subject level in Figure 60. It is clear from Figure 60 that for 
subjects who do play those iteratively dominated strategies with positive probabilities ( 
i.e. the points that do not fall on the X-axis) ,  the individualized estimates of ! is 
negatively correlated with the empirical frequencies of selecting the 1st and 2nd order of 
iteratively dominated strategies, but not with the 3rd level of interactively dominated 
strategies. It is consistent with the hypothesis that if a play adopt higher level of belief 
based learning, he will learn faster to eliminate at least low level of dominated strategies 
over 80 rounds of the play.  
Furthermore, elderly cohort does not significantly differ from the young cohort in 
the in-game experience decay rate " for both strong and weak roles. " is usually 
associated with the speed of the adaption to the external environment. In general, if a 
player believes his/her opponent is a fast adaptor, he/she will adapt fast too.   
That is, he/she will have a small " that depreciates past attractions faster. 
According to our result both young and elderly cohorts utilized relatively large value of " 
(.95 for young cohort and .89 for the elderly cohort average across strong and weak 
roles), suggesting that both groups played smoothly in response to the external 
environment depreciating the past in-game experience relatively slowly.  Notably, our 
design controlled for the adaptation speed of the external environment by letting both 
young and elderly cohorts face the same pool of opponents’ behavior. 
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Figure 60: The relationship between estimated ! and frequency of 
playing the iteratively dominated strategies at individual subject level. A-
C: estimated individualized ! against 1st, 2nd and 3rd level of elimination.  
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Interestingly, the estimated values for $ are significantly different across two 
groups. $ is the discount rate for the strength of experience measure N(t), and controls the 
influence of the prior beliefs. If $ is large, prior belief will wear off quickly. (Camerer 
and Ho 1999) Our estimated result suggested that the elderly subjects have more 
persistent prior belief at group level.  In order to visualize the result, Figure 61 presents 
simulated influence of prior belief over 80 rounds based on the above best fit estimation 
for each age group and each role.  In all the cases, the influence of prior is measured by 
N(0)
N(t) , which is the weight assigned to A(0) within A(t). As benchmarks for comparisons, 
the time trends for N(0)N(t)  under standard RL and standard fictitious play are also included. 
When RL is adopted, the prior will receive a time invariant weight that equals to 1.  
Whereas according to standard fictitious play, the influence of prior belief will drop to 
zero within the first 20 rounds. As shown in Figure 61, the elderly subjects’ behavior is 
largely in line with reinforcement learning under the strong role, whereas young subjects’ 
prior decays rapidly within first 20 rounds, similar to that in fictitious play. But its 
influence converges to .2 for the rest of the game. In weak role however, young subjects 
started with a much strong prior and converged to a similar level as that of the elderly 
subjects.  Overall my result indicates that after controlling for N(0), the strength of the 
prior belief, prior belief has longer more persistent influence on elderly cohort’s choices.  
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Figure 61: The simulated influences of prior belief throughout 80 rounds, 
measured by N(0)N(t) , which is the weight assigned onto the initial 
attraction at time t.  Left: In strong role. Right: In weak role.   
 
To summarize, the computational model formalized the mechanical assumptions 
for internal reasoning and learning during repeated strategic interactions, seeking to 
identify the age-related difference for strategic learning, i.e. why at group level, the 
elderly subjects did not learn to eliminate the iteratively dominated strategies as the 
young cohort did. My result suggests that the reasons are two folds: on one hand, the 
elderly cohort adopts more reinforcement learning and less belief-based learning 
compared to the young cohort. Hence it is less likely for them to observe that a certain 
strategies have rarely been played by opponents, which in turn slows down learning to 
reduce the use of iteratively dominated strategies. On the other hand, elderly subjects on 
average have a more persistent prior belief, controlling for the strength of the prior. 
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Consequently their beliefs evolve slower over the course of the experiment, although they 
use the in-game experience as much as the young cohort.  
 
4.7. Discussions 
The study is motivated by my previous findings that strategic learning involves 
both striatal and medial prefrontal regions of the brain and the fact that elderly people 
usually experience degeneration in those brain regions. I used a repeated normal form 
Patent Race game as a probe to search for the possible behavioral signature underlying 
strategic learning for the elderly population. This is particularly interesting given the 
conflicting evidences in the existing aging literature.  
In this study I compared the behavioral performance between the younger and 
older adults with both model free and model-based measurements. First I showed that 
consistent with previous studies, the elderly cohort and young cohort do not differ 
significantly in strategic reasoning (theory of mind) when assessing from a static point of 
view.  However, from a dynamic point of view, the elderly subjects adapted poorer for 
the repeated strategic interactions compared to the young subjects. By adopting a 
computational framework that nests both reinforcement and belief based learning, and 
allows for sophisticated discount of past experience, I explored the internal mechanism 
for the age-related difference in strategic learning. Somewhat surprisingly, I showed that 
the elderly cohort on average learn slower, not because they forget the recent experiences 
faster than the young subjects as many stereotypes would suggest, but because (1)their 
choices evolve more through reinforcing the received rewards and punishments, while 
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less through best responding to the beliefs about the opponent’s future actions; and (2) 
their prior belief decays slower and hence has more persistent influence in their decisions.  
It is worth noting, however, that the study potentially suffers from the following 
limitations. Firstly, it lacks proper control over potential differences across age groups 
resulting from historical influences, such as educational opportunity, cultural factors and 
socioeconomic status.  This kind of problem is almost unavoidable in almost all sectional 
studies on aging. Longitude studies, on the other hand, will be suitable for better control 
over historical factors.  
Secondly, the group level EWA estimation is known to suffer from the downward 
biasing in estimated value for ! due to the possible individual heterogeneity in observed 
choices (Wilcox 2006). Such bias may magnify the estimated age-related difference in 
the engagement in reinforcement and belief-based learning, as the elderly cohort behavior 
may present larger individual differences. To alleviate the problem, individualized 
estimation is needed. Such individualized estimation will only serve as an initial step for 
developing biomarkers for the aging brain.  
Future work will include the following. Firstly, I will compare the performances 
under computer vs. real human opponents treatments across young and elderly cohort 
with the same Patent Race game. My hypotheses are: (1) Even when computer algorithm 
adopts the exactly same probability as the empirical frequency of choices by the real 
human opponents, more naïve strategies will be used in response to the computer 
opponent. Elderly subjects on average will utilize lower level of strategic reasoning as 
measured by my model-free measurement and has smaller value of estimated ! as in the 
model-based measurement; (2) the difference across computer and real human opponents 
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treatments will be more significant within young cohort than the elderly cohort; (3) the 
elderly cohort learns slower in human treatment than in computer treatment, as their prior 
on how other human will behave have more persistent influences.  
Secondly, I will characterize neural system underlying strategic learning and age-
related changes, which will include using fMRI to examine the neural mechanisms 
underlying strategic learning in the two cohorts using the competitive game and will test 
the following two hypotheses derived from recent results in neuroeconomics. In 
particular, I have the following hypotheses: (1) strategic learning across all cohorts will 
be driven by multiple inputs from distinct brain systems—a striatum-based reinforcement 
learning system and a medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) based belief-based learning 
system, consistent with my findings in Chpater 2. (2) Compared to young adults, mPFC 
activity associated with belief-based learning will be diminished in old adults relative to 
reinforcement learning in striatal regions. That is, the balance between reinforcement and 
social learning will tip toward reinforcement in old adults.  Together, the proposed future 
work will aim at providing new measures for neuropsychological assessment of cognitive 
function and development of better tools for assessing cognitive function; improving our 
understanding of nervous system and behavioral changes that occur with normal aging 
and how brain function is maintained and enhanced; and identifying neuroimaging 
biomarkers for early detection of cognitive decline. 
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